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ABSTRACT 
The polygraph occupies a contentious place in the justice system. The instrument 
detects various physical responses and records these results, and the examiner interprets 
the readings and makes a determination on whether the test subject was truthful or 
deceptive. Polygraphs are, in some jurisdictions, a part of the court process and in others 
are forbidden. On the whole, there is less research on the polygraph and their 
permissibility in the legal process compared to other types of evidence. There is even less 
research on the opinions of jurors, especially compared to surveys of criminal justice 
professionals. That which is present is inconsistent. This thesis was intended to measure 
the opinions of a pool of potential jurors on the relative weight and veracity they assign to 
the polygraph. With the noted inconsistency, this research was primarily exploratory and 
replicative in nature. To obtain data, a 17-question online survey was administered to 
students in nine selected courses. Professors in these courses either forwarded the survey 
link to their students via email or posted the link on Blackboard. It was emphasized that 
the survey was strictly voluntary. There were three hypotheses: respondents would have 
only moderate faith in the polygraph, criminal justice students would have harsher views 
than those not in such courses, and that those selected to receive the extra literature 
summary would have harsher views than those who did not. Results of the study only 
substantiated the first hypothesis. Chi-square analysis showed an almost complete lack of 
significance in theorized relationships. Receipt of the additional literature summary only 
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affected the respondents’ general opinions of polygraph evidence and was insignificant 
for every other dependent variable.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examined the opinions of potential jurors on the scientific validity and 
continued necessity of polygraphs in the criminal justice system. The science appears 
solid, since most polygraph instruments test for involuntary physiological responses to 
questions (National Research Council, 2003). A baseline response is typically drawn 
from questions that people should have no issue passing, such as their name. When the 
body reacts differently than this baseline, the examiner will ask further questions 
regarding the matter, possibly concluding with their professional judgment that the 
person is being deceptive (National Research Council, 2003). Approximately 80 years 
ago, the polygraph made its official debut in the courtroom judging guilt in a murder trial 
(Wisconsin v. Grignano & Loniello, 1935). 
The primary research question addressed was: what is the level of belief that the 
average college student (as a potential juror) has in polygraph use and accuracy? If this 
could be answered definitively, then it would lead to additional questions: what degree of 
use should the polygraph have? In a more general sense, does the public trust the 
polygraph? This research was intended to be a descriptive study of college students, as 
formulating policy implications would require a larger, more publicly representative 
sample than was achieved here. 
However, the practice and theory of polygraphing is not exact, nor are the results 
always accurate (Steinbrook, 1992). Even earlier than the murder trial mentioned above, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had determined in Frye v. United States (1923) that the 
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instrument had not gained scientific acceptance in the community and therefore was 
inadmissible in courts. An example of this lack of acceptance can be observed on an 
episode of the well-known television show Mythbusters, where the build team tested 
several methods that purportedly allowed one to beat the polygraph, that is, to be 
deceitful and go undetected. While two out of their three attempts failed, one succeeded, 
which was evidence that it was possible to lie on a polygraph. Criticism of the polygraph 
frequently is rooted in disagreement over its accuracy. According to detractors, polygraph 
instruments are not the only source of error; examiners and the methods of the test are 
also to blame. As a whole, critics argue that the polygraph is simply too fallible to have a 
role in the justice system (Gallai, 1999). 
For polygraph evidence to be admitted into courts, it must pass the Daubert test. 
The Daubert test requires the party seeking polygraph introduction to demonstrate to the 
judge’s satisfaction its validity, replicability, and scientific support for the practice. To 
pass this test, it is helpful for polygraph proponents to be able to refer to general 
polygraph theory. Honts and Quick (1995) clarified what exactly is meant by the term 
‘theory’. Honts and Quick’s (1995) stated definition is appropriate here: a theory is not a 
statement of fact, but scientific statements of belief in causal relationships between two or 
more variables (Honts & Quick, 1995). While a statement of unequivocal fact was 
practically impossible when dealing with the social sciences and especially human 
subjects, it was unclear whether the results in the literature on polygraphs met the second 
part of the stated definition for theory. While literature certainly did exist that supports 
the polygraph, virtually all of it only suggested a relationship, not causality. Polygraph 
advocates often emphasized the theoretical value of the instrument within the justice 
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system: that it can provide evidence of crime-relevant knowledge even in the face of a 
suspect who is not forthcoming. Federal and state agencies also continue to improve the 
standards of instrument and examiner, as well as emphasize the importance of using 
technology to aid in examiner analysis. Progress has certainly been made in these fields, 
and some jurisdictions have begun to allow the polygraph in court (Lee v. Martinez, 
2004). 
Unfortunately, in comparison to such topics as recidivism, probation, and 
attitudes toward police, there is a comparative dearth of information on polygraphs. In 
particular, there is a notable shortage of studies that analyze the degree of trust the public 
has in polygraphs. One issue that unfortunately could not be rectified is that results of 
most polygraph research were classified by the U.S. government, which made them 
inaccessible for reference. This study primarily identified the opinions on comparative 
polygraph veracity, with a minor component asking respondents to grade their own 
ability to detect lies informally. The remainder of the thesis includes a review of present 
literature on the topic of polygraphs, the methodology utilized in the study, and a 
discussion of its weaknesses and strengths. The final sections address the results, 
analyses, and the conclusions drawn from the data. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
To reach a conclusion in the judicial part of the legal process, evidence is 
necessary. To convict an individual in a criminal court, the standard of proof required is 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (Woolmington v. DPP, 1935). Evidence can be of many 
types, though the most important in the context of this research is that of polygraph 
examinations. The primary research question addressed was: what is the level of belief 
that potential jurors have in the polygraph’s accuracy and usage in courtroom decisions? 
Secondarily, are potential jurors educated enough to distinguish between the differing 
types of polygraph evidence: positive detection against negative non-detection? Lastly, 
the study also briefly examined the perceptions of personal lie detection: how accurate do 
individuals believe they are at identifying lies informally? 
Polygraph Science and Theory 
The theoretical value of the polygraph in the courtroom is significant. Because 
court decisions involve determinations of fact and fiction, a way to objectively establish 
fact would be of tremendous practical value. The prosecution and defense (as well as 
their involved witnesses) have an interest in ensuring that the result is favorable to them. 
Due to the presence of this interest, it is important that the justice system have a way to 
establish or investigate the objectivity of the evidence that these individuals provide. Ibek 
(2012) summarized it concisely, explaining that in a courtroom, a polygraph could be 
used to demonstrate that a person has crime-relevant knowledge despite outward denial. 
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When speaking of polygraphs, it is very important to understand that there is not 
one particular way to conduct all exams (National Research Council, 2003). Not only can 
the instrument vary in what it measures (e.g., some gauge stress responses from the skin – 
i.e. sweat, rushes of blood, others may monitor heart rate / pulse), but the way that 
questions are formed in the interview and phrased on the exam will vary by person, 
agency, examiner, and format of test (National Research Council, 2003). Honts and Perry 
(1992) nonetheless emphasized that these differences in measurement do not always 
amount to a statistically significant result on the polygraph itself. It is also important to be 
clear on the three types of results of polygraph exams: non-deceptive, inconclusive, and 
deceptive (Honts, 2013). Non-deceptive results indicate that the examiner and instrument 
found no deception. Deceptive results, as one might expect, indicate that deception was 
detected. Inconclusive results indicate that a judgment could not be made on whether 
deception was present (Honts, 2013). 
Despite this, there are still common themes to all polygraphs (National Research 
Council, 2003). Every investigative polygraph will involve a pre-exam interview, where 
the examiner will talk to the subject at length. There are multiple reasons for this 
interview. First, it allows the examiner to explain the test procedure to the individual in 
detail as well as the possibility to address any concerns the test subject may have 
(National Research Council, 2003). Second, the interview also gives the examiner a 
reasonable length of time to establish an understanding of the emotional state of the 
subject. Third, the interview can involve a brief demonstration of the polygraph’s 
function where the subject may be asked to lie about an unrelated topic, and the examiner 
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will show that the instrument is capable of detecting the deception (National Research 
Council, 2003). 
While neural imaging is separate from polygraphs, understanding the science of 
lying is important to polygraphs as well. Neural imaging is a relatively new development, 
where magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is used to identify and measure brain activity. 
This technology can and has been used to study the brain’s autonomic response to lying. 
One of the assumptions of guilty knowledge test (GKT) polygraphs is that lying places 
more stress on the brain than telling the truth. GKTs are a format of polygraph exam that 
attempt to determine whether the test subject possesses the ‘guilty knowledge’ for which 
the test is named. Neurons may respond almost instantly to a stimulus, but the 
corresponding changes in blood flow to certain areas of the brain have a delay of one to 
two seconds, on average (Greely & Illes, 2007). Some polygraphs and imaging exams use 
blood pressure as indicators of activity, and while blood flow is a reasonably consistent 
measure for activity, this connection is not perfect (National Research Council, 2003). 
Because the brain also controls several autonomic functions that sustain life, there is not a 
true zero point for comparison (Greely & Illes, 2007). Greely and Illes (2007) clarified 
that muscle movement and corresponding blood flow also occur naturally during a 
polygraph or investigation, as individuals shift and engage in whatever small behaviors 
they have to in order to feel comfortable. One of the problems that blood pressure-based 
polygraphs encounter is individuality: each person, especially those with disabilities or 
traumatic injuries, will respond differently. This not only makes interpreting the test 
results of one individual more difficult, but makes it even more problematic to try to 
establish any standard, since no response would be repeatable (Greely & Illes, 2007). A 
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standard is generally preferable over individual interpretations, because as Raskin and 
Kircher (2014) indicated, a lack of standard is a risk factor for bias. 
Types of Polygraph Exams 
Iacono (2008) also explained that one method of polygraph administration, the 
relevant-irrelevant test, is not used in investigative manners because of its potential 
intimidation factor. A relevant-irrelevant polygraph exam compares the responses of two 
types of questions. Relevant questions are obviously those which are pertinent to the 
crime at hand (Iacono, 2008). An example of this form of question, in a case of homicide, 
could be, “Did you shoot the victim in the head?”. An irrelevant question is one that is 
designed to provoke no noticeable response and is frequently an obviously-true statement 
such as, “Is the sky blue?”. The problems associated with this form of polygraph exam 
are quickly evident. It is vague and in the opinion of the National Research Council 
(2003) should not be used. The relevant-irrelevant test in particular has a high risk of 
eliciting false positives (Iacono, 2008). The physiological fear response associated with 
being criminally detected and of a falsely positive detection is not always distinguishable 
for a polygraph instrument and can be interpreted as criminal in nature by the examiner 
(Iacono, 2008). Nevertheless, Iacono (2008) did not call for an abolition of polygraph 
use, explaining that it has value in investigations, provided the results can be 
corroborated. In some instances, corroboration can be achieved by administering another 
type of polygraph. 
The control question test (CQT) format is similar in some respects to the relevant-
irrelevant test, though with some improvements. In this format, there are two types of 
questions. The relevant questions are defined identically as in the relevant-irrelevant test; 
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those which inquire about matters relevant specifically to the subject of investigation 
(National Research Council, 2003). Control questions in the CQT ask of generally 
undesirable acts, which can but does not always include behaviors similar to the topic of 
investigation. In a battery case, a control question might be, “Have you ever fought 
anyone?”, where a relevant question would be, “Did you fight John Smith on this date?” 
(National Research Council, 2003). The theory behind CQT tests is that innocent 
individuals will respond more strongly towards the comparison questions because the 
questions may still deal with criminal behaviors, while the guilty will respond strongly to 
the relevant questions because they have specific knowledge or memory of the crime 
being investigated (National Research Council, 2003). 
Staunton and Hammond (2011) examined the use of what practitioners call the 
guilty knowledge test (GKT), how physical responses can vary based on gender, and how 
different polygraph types measure their responses for deception. The GKT process 
includes examiner questions which have one relevant choice, typically a criminal detail, 
and control alternatives which would be inconsequential to those with no knowledge of 
the matter. Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel, and Kremnitzer (2002) explained that the theoretical 
basis of the GKT is in the orienting responses of humans. To understand this, a simple 
definition is required. An orienting response is the brain’s subconscious reaction to a 
change or stimulus in an environment, but not enough to merit the startle response (Ben-
Shakhar et al., 2002). Individuals who have the ‘guilty knowledge’ the exam is testing for 
will unconsciously react when pertinent questions arise regarding it, even if they try to 
suppress it. Previous analyses have only focused on the positive influence of measures 
based on the electric responses in the skin, which is the most common method utilized. 
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Staunton and Hammond (2011) found that this emphasis leads to an incomplete and 
sometimes erroneous picture of guilt or innocence. They concurred that lying is 
cognitively demanding and that lying does tend to result in arousal of the autonomic 
nervous system, which is the overall premise of polygraphs. This study was similar in this 
respect to the research of Staunton and Hammond (2011), as it did not intend to challenge 
the premise of polygraphs. It is worth mentioning that Honts and Perry (1992) found that 
GKT polygraphs were considered, among federal law enforcement, to be of very little 
worth, to the point where they were not even discussed in a typical polygraph course. 
Polygraph Use in Court 
Faigman, Fienberg and Stern (2003) explained the discretionary license given to 
polygraph examiners and the overall lack of clarity of the purpose of such tests. They also 
provided a useful historical narrative which details the expansion of polygraphs and 
overall historical trends. Beginning with the Frye case, polygraphs immediately ran into 
issues when brought into the courtroom. For most of the next 70 years, courts typically 
prohibited the introduction of polygraphs as evidence on the basis of them failing to meet 
the ‘general acceptance’ standards set forth by Frye (Faigman et al., 2003). Daubert 
modified these standards, avoiding the usage of the vague term ‘general acceptance’ as a 
standard. Faigman et al. (2003) began their analysis with the contention that the 
polygraph has overstepped its bounds. Faigman et al. (2003) argued that no scientific 
justifications have been discovered for the polygraph’s employment, and that it was 
overall based on an unfounded supposition. They continued on to claim that the 
polygraph falls under the scope of Federal Rule 403, which prohibits the introduction of 
otherwise-admissible evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
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unfair prejudice” (Faigman et al., 2003, p. 3). As the authors viewed it, the potential 
worth of polygraphs as evidence was outweighed by the potential risk of skewing jury 
decisions. 
Han (2016) explored the reasons for differing state standards on the polygraph. 
His numbers on usage were likely to still be current, and he indicated that 18 states allow 
conditional introduction of polygraph evidence, while the other 32 flatly forbid it. Every 
state that allows the usage of polygraph evidence requires that both parties stipulate 
specifically how it would be used and its relevance to the topic. Han (2016) theorized that 
there are a few reasons why states would require joint agreement on the topic. First, if 
both the prosecution and defense agree to the admission of a polygraph test, this is an 
implicit acceptance of the veracity of the evidence. By allowing it where it is frequently 
prohibited elsewhere, the parties are indicating sufficient trust in its validity to allow 
jurors and judges to interpret it for themselves. Second, if the parties agreed to its use, 
this could also be considered a waiver of their right to object based on evidentiary 
quality. The stipulation obviously did not change the accuracy level of the polygraph, but 
agreeing to allow it waived the parties’ right to object to its probative value (Han, 2016).  
Some states tack on additional requirements in order for polygraphs to be 
admissible in court. Indiana Supreme Court rulings have held that, not only must the 
prosecution and defense agree to its inclusion, judges are mandated to consider the 
potential consequences of a wrong polygraph, because “the probable impact of the 
polygraph reference upon the verdict is of prime importance” (Han, 2016, p. 5). The side 
petitioning for the polygraph introduction must also demonstrate, via expert testimony or 
otherwise, a measure of reliability and acceptance of the polygraph and a clear 
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explanation of the theory and its implementation in the present case. Three of the 18 
states which allow polygraph evidence restrict its use to corroboration, cases of 
impeachment, and probation revocation (Han, 2016, p. 5). The Washington Supreme 
Court held, based in part off a ruling from the Arizona Supreme Court, that polygraph 
evidence has an acceptable niche in terms of corroborating other forms of evidence or in 
impeachment of a defendant’s testimony. If the defendant does not testify, ‘standalone’ 
polygraph evidence is prohibited (Han, 2016).  
Part of the reason for skepticism around polygraphs in the courtroom was derived 
from the inconsistent methods of interpretation. Being found to be non-deceptive could 
be a strong influence on the justice system to drop its case against the individual. 
However, because of the differing policies of various agencies, the consequences, 
especially of inconclusive tests, could be wildly different. Honts (2013) explained that, in 
the FBI, an inconclusive result is treated precisely the same as a deceptive result, 
resulting almost inevitably in further interrogation and investigation. 
Polygraph Law and Court Challenges 
Polygraphs occupy a tenuous position in the legal system. Honts and Perry (1992) 
discussed the then-current laws in place regarding the usage of polygraphs both inside a 
courtroom and outside of it. Polygraphs have been in the past and still are components of 
some criminal investigations. Exams are occasionally used as tools by prosecutors and 
police agencies. Both parties may offer an accused individual an opportunity to take the 
polygraph; if clear, the charges would be dropped, but otherwise the case would proceed 
forward with the exam results likely to be referred to as evidence (Honts & Perry, 1992). 
Until the Daubert case in 1993, the measure for polygraph admissibility was the Frye 
12 
 
 
test, also known as the general acceptance test. If the methodology or technique used to 
obtain the evidence had obtained ‘general acceptance’ in the scientific community, it 
would be admissible in criminal proceedings (Frye v. United States, 1923). However, 
based on the ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), the standards for 
evidentiary inclusion were changed significantly. The Daubert test required that the 
methodology used to gather the evidence be demonstrably scientifically valid and its 
relevance be properly explained to the matters being considered (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 1993). Even under the Frye test, polygraphs had encountered mixed 
results in terms of admissibility. Under the Daubert standards, only 18 states allow 
admission of polygraph evidence, and of these states, many require that the involved 
parties stipulate this beforehand, as well as allow the trial judge to be the ultimate 
decision-maker (Han, 2016). 
Given that the Daubert standard requires polygraph evidence to be demonstrably 
valid and relevant, the lack of consistency in the literature is an issue for proponents of 
the polygraph such as Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002). Additionally, if the examiner needs to 
testify before the court, there are regulations that they must meet (Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702, 2018). A polygraph examiner is considered an expert witness in most 
cases. They did not see the crime committed, but their expertise in a matter relevant to the 
crime makes them capable of informing the court on the matter (Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702, 2018). As expert witnesses, in order for them to be allowed to testify, they 
must demonstrate to the court their credibility and ability to speak candidly on the topic 
at hand. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) give the trial judge a great deal of 
discretion in determining whether the expert meets their standards for credibility (Honts 
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& Perry, 1992). Expert witness testimony must also meet the Daubert standard. In 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner (1997), the court specified that results of the expert’s analysis 
must logically lead to the opinion they give. Similarly, the case of Claar v. Burlington 
(1994) required that expert testimony account for the presence of obvious alternatives. 
In cases that involve a polygraph, the lack of scientific support often requires the 
presence of an expert witness to convince the judge of its utility (Faigman, Fienberg, & 
Stern, 2003). It is important that the jury understands that the polygraph is not infallible, 
but emphasizing this potential error must be done without unfairly prejudicing the jury 
against the evidence, or the results may be dismissed (Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 
2018). 
However, even if the expert meets all the qualifications to the satisfaction of the 
judge, it does not necessarily mean that evidence they propose to explain would be 
permitted. Honts and Perry (1992) clarified that there are two types of evidence that 
polygraph results could potentially fall under: legal relevance and logical relevance. 
Legal relevance involves the question of whether the evidence tends to make more or less 
probable any facts of consequence in the matter. Logical relevance is slightly more 
abstract, and comparisons can be drawn to the Frye test. Logical relevance concerns 
whether the evidence being offered has a tendency to prove what it purports to prove 
(Honts & Perry, 1992). For example, if an attorney proposed some theoretical connection 
between consumption of asparagus and personality disposition to commit robbery, the 
judge would understandably have difficulty seeing the logical relevance of the 
defendant’s dietary habits. 
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There are multiple reasons why polygraph evidence has fared differently under 
the newer standard than other types. While the Frye test requires general acceptance and 
Daubert does not, the shaky case precedent of polygraphs continues to be a problem. 
Judges who reject the polygraph in the states that do not universally prohibit it could 
point to a 2003 publication by the National Research Council, which concluded that 
improvements in polygraph accuracy have been slow and that the physiological measures 
employed by most polygraphs are inherently ambiguous (Pettit, 2007). Brain imaging 
techniques are significantly more accurate but also carry with them the problem of 
increased cost and the potential for the improper use previously mentioned. Another 
significant obstacle to polygraph introduction is judges’ concerns that it “invades the 
province of the jury” (Pettit, 2007, p. 10). Under FRE 403, even relevant evidence may 
be excluded if its contribution toward establishing fact is mitigated by a substantial risk 
of prejudicing the jury (Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 2018).  
Pettit (2007) also went into greater detail on the implications of the case of U.S. v. 
Scheffer (1998). Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, focused on three primary issues 
in upholding MRE 707’s prohibition of polygraph evidence. Pettit (2007) identified the 
first of these issues as the government’s interest in ensuring that evidence permitted at 
criminal trials is reliable, on which the Supreme Court ruled that “there is no consensus 
within the scientific community that the polygraph test is reliable” (Pettit, 2007, p. 11). 
The simultaneous presence of cautious criticism from Staunton and Hammond (2011) 
and strong support from Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002) on the veracity of the GKT is one 
example of what the Supreme Court may have been referencing. The second issue 
contributing to the affirmation of MRE 707 was a section of the majority opinion on 
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which Justice Thomas had only three other Justices join: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Souter (Pettit, 2007). Within this section, Pettit (2007) explained the 
Justices’ interest in preserving traditional roles for criminal justice decision-making. In 
the opinion of these four Justices, “the jury is the lie detector” (Pettit, 2007, p. 12) and 
allowing the polygraph into courts poses a risk of changing this fundamental role of the 
jury. The third issue, again joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Souter, was a 
government interest in “avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence 
of the accused” (Pettit, 2007, p. 12). These four Justices believed that introducing 
polygraph evidence would result in additional lawsuits and legal questioning that do not 
relate to the crime at hand, which could potentially confuse the jurors as to whether they 
are determining guilt or proper examiner demeanor (Pettit, 2007).  
The Supreme Court was far from unanimous in this case, as four justices on the 
majority did not join in the additional sections. Justice Stevens dissented with the entire 
decision. These five justices rejected the second and third arguments towards banning 
polygraphs. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg, 
concurred that the scientific literature and community did not hold any consensus view 
on the polygraph, which was reason enough to uphold the prohibition in MRE 707 (Pettit, 
2007). However, Kennedy and the other three justices specifically disagreed with the 
argument over ensuring traditional roles for criminal justice decision-making. They 
categorically rejected Thomas’ argument that polygraph evidence threatened to usurp the 
jury’s role as assessor and trier of fact (Pettit, 2007). Justice Stevens, the only fully 
dissenting justice, rejected the majority’s claim that there was no consensus in the 
scientific community. Stevens did not argue that polygraph tests were perfectly accurate; 
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neither did he argue that they necessarily needed to be expanded in use. However, Pettit 
(2007) summarized Stevens’ most vocal disagreement with the majority opinion as a flat 
rejection of the idea that polygraph evidence is seen as infallible by jurors. While not yet 
published at that time of the Scheffer decision, the findings of Myers, Latter, and 
Abdollahi-Arena (2006) lend credence to Justice Stevens’ dissent. 
Support for Polygraphs 
Polygraphs are not without their proponents in the justice system and among 
published authors. Offe and Offe (2007) achieved a 90% rate of correct identification by 
using a CQT administered in a mock crime situation and opined that the justice system’s 
view of polygraphs as inherently inaccurate is a criticism that cannot be sustained. They 
used a sample of both university students and law enforcement trainees, who were 
informed of the nature of the experiment. Offe and Offe (2007) also allowed participants 
to decide whether they wanted to participate in the survey as either guilty or innocent 
individuals. They incentivized participation by offering a 50 € reward for individuals who 
participated in the guilty sub-group and were deemed as innocent by the polygraph, as 
well as a 15 € reward for individuals who chose the innocent sub-group and were rightly 
exonerated by their polygraph. Ultimately, 35 people chose to participate as guilty and 30 
chose innocent. While it (N = 65) was a reasonably-large sample, it was not large enough 
to make conclusions which can be widely generalized. However, as with all mock crime 
research, there exists the limitation of accurately simulating the severity of consequences 
that would be present in a real criminal proceeding. Failing a polygraph administered in a 
mock crime situation is only significant as a data point in the researcher’s analysis. For a 
suspect under criminal investigation, failing a polygraph could determine whether they 
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are acquitted or convicted. The theoretical use for polygraphs in the justice system is 
virtually inarguable, as Ibek (2012) explained that it can indicate the presence of 
deception and guilt despite outward denial. Because few if any offenders genuinely wish 
to be caught and punished, they are unlikely to be forthcoming, and this is where an 
accurate polygraph exam could be an incredibly useful tool. 
To improve polygraph accuracy and strengthen its theoretical background, 
Handler, Honts, Krapohl, Nelson, and Griffin (2009) had several suggestions to increase 
polygraph accuracy and generalizability. Handler et al. (2009) found a general trend 
among published writers that urged the expanded use of computers and data-driven 
hypotheses, very similar to the conclusions of Honts and Quick (1995) as well as Raskin 
and Kircher (2014). There is reason to be hopeful, as Handler et al. (2009) explained that 
the American Polygraph Association (APA) and American Society of Testing and 
Materials (ASTM) are working on forming a set of data-driven policies and guidelines 
for polygraph use everywhere. 
Handler et al. (2009) designated several procedures for devising appropriate 
polygraph questions. Naturally, the answers to these questions should provide 
interpretable and useful information to the examiner. Questions should deal specifically 
with one alleged behavior or action. Increasing the length of time that a test subject has to 
remember back causes issues of telescoping, where individuals will mistakenly include 
events that were not within the timeframe specified (Handler et al., 2009). They should 
be easily answerable with just ‘yes’ or ‘no’, should not include any legal or criminal 
jargon, and should be devoid of references to motive or intent. As with every other aspect 
of the judicial system, the test should not presuppose the guilt or involvement of its 
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subject. Behaviors or actions need to have an operational definition that is understood 
clearly by both the examiner and subject. When presented in court, the results should also 
be explained intelligibly and their significance / probative value be understood by all 
involved parties (i.e. judge, prosecution, defense, and jurors) (Handler et al., 2009). 
Despite other researchers looking doubtfully on the utility of polygraphs, Ben-
Shakhar et al. (2002) believed that the GKT can be used successfully in criminal 
proceedings. The GKT is much less common, even for the already rare use of polygraphs 
in criminal proceedings, as the authors described that it is only used in Japan with any 
regularity. A brief review of the practice of the GKT is important here, as its differences 
from the CQT are what Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002) theorized make it more valid. Ben-
Shakhar et al. (2002) believed one of the advantages of the GKT is that it focuses more 
on what an individual knows rather than trying to subjectively interpret meaning from 
emotions and conditioned responses. Their conclusion regarding the GKT polygraph 
exam was that it can detect neurological arousal / change even when no verbal response 
is given (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2002). 
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002) included two major requirements in order for GKT 
questioning and exams to be valid. For the orienting response to present itself, the 
questions need to pertain strictly to knowledge or details that a guilty individual would 
have and be likely to remember. For example, it would be very unlikely that a bank 
robber would notice and specifically recall the number of lights in the restroom of a bank 
they had robbed. Conversely, it would be much more probable that they would recall the 
combination or location of the keys to a cash drawer or safe. For a GKT question to be 
effective here, the examiner should focus on the crime-relevant issue objects. The authors 
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also made very clear that relevant information known to police should be kept stringently 
confidential so as to not ‘contaminate’ innocent subjects with guilty knowledge (Ben-
Shakhar et al., 2002). This is an admitted weakness of the GKT, as in notorious cases, 
keeping all details from the public may be impossible. However, Ben-Shakhar et al. 
(2002) proposed a solution which seemed to remedy this at least in part. If the examiner 
was blind as to the relevant details, they would be much less able or likely to frame the 
questions in a biased way in order to get a conviction. The importance of preventing such 
contamination goes beyond the validity of the test. While very few cases, if any, have 
dispositions that are entirely determined by a polygraph result, the ‘fruit of the poisonous 
tree’ doctrine from an early Supreme Court ruling would require that a case which 
included a polygraph result be conducted in accord with all regulations and standards 
(Silverthorne Lumber Company vs. United States, 1920). The fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine states that, if initial evidence was gathered in an inappropriate or illegal matter, 
all evidence derived from it would also be considered illegal, even if the rest of the 
process was conducted in accordance with legal guidelines. A case which was based even 
in part off a polygraph could be destroyed by one incorrectly-administered exam (Ben-
Shakhar et al., 2002). 
Opposition to Polygraphs 
Gallai (1999) argued that several factors regarding the then-current 
implementation and science of polygraphs render them inadmissible as evidence in a 
courtroom setting. The stipulations of federal law require replicable, non-prejudicial, and 
non-biasing circumstances for evidentiary submission. Under those iterations of federal 
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law, Gallai (1999) argued that judges are properly exercising their discretion to prohibit 
polygraphs as evidence in federal court. 
Honts and Perry (1992) specifically analyzed one type of polygraph test: the 
control question test (CQT). CQT polygraphs ask two types of questions, those which 
pertain specifically to the crime or act under investigation, and a control question that 
deals with generally undesirable behaviors but not those under present investigation. At 
the time of publishing, Honts and Perry (1992) found a very large range in literature-
determined accuracy for both CQT and GKT polygraphs, “ranging from chance to near 
perfection” (p. 5). Analyses / research that have been conducted on CQT and GKT 
polygraphs since that date have also been critical. An analysis by Honts and Raskin 
(1988) found rather strong support for the validity of the control question test: 85% of the 
innocent individuals were deemed so by the polygraph, and 92% of the guilty individuals 
were labeled such by their results. However, for the innocent group, the remaining 15% 
had polygraph results labeled ‘inconsistent’. For the guilty group, the remaining 8% were 
falsely exonerated by the polygraph. It must be mentioned that the sample sizes for both 
of these groups were extremely small (N = 13 for innocent, N = 12 for guilty), and as 
such, any conclusions drawn from the data should be approached with caution, as the 
small sample size makes it very difficult to generalize accurately to a larger population. 
Honts and Raskin’s (1988) results were interesting when compared against other 
research on the CQT. In a later study, Raskin (1989) had more negative results: only 61% 
of innocents were seen as such by the polygraph, with 31% of this group having 
inconclusive results and 8% being falsely condemned. For the guilty control group, the 
numbers were not much better: 73% were properly determined to be guilty by the 
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polygraph and the remaining 27% were left with inconclusive results. The problem of 
sample size was slightly alleviated, as Raskin (1989) had an (N = 26) for the innocent 
group, and (N = 37) for the guilty test group. In a later study by Patrick and Iacono 
(1991), the negative trend was even worse: 30% of the innocent group was viewed as 
such by the test, with 46% inconclusive and 24% incorrectly condemned. The results for 
the guilty were surprisingly strong: 92% labelled correctly as guilty, and only 6% and 2% 
respectively for inconclusive and incorrect exonerations. Sample sizes were also 
improved in Patrick and Iacono’s study (1991), though still not to the point where one 
would be comfortable theorizing widely-applicable conclusions from the data: (N = 37) 
for innocent, (N = 52) for guilty. 
Honts and Perry (1992) alluded to one of the problems of polygraphs, that juries 
may have a much broader interpretation of the results and their significance than they 
truly represent. A polygraph result is ultimately the opinion of the examiner as to whether 
or not the individual being accused or testifying in court was truthful. The jury, as the 
trier of fact, determines whether the evidence presented to them by the polygraph is 
worth considering when the named individual is testifying (Honts & Perry, 1992). When 
considering the issue of logical relevance of polygraph results, the frequent criticism in 
literature and relatively large range in stated accuracy very likely contribute to the 
technique’s uncommonness in the courtroom. Jurisdictions more influenced by the lower 
results for accuracy tend to prohibit it, while those that take greater stock in the higher 
rates err on the side of allowing it (Honts & Perry, 1992). 
It is not solely criminal defendants and their attorneys who complain about the 
usage of polygraphs in the courtroom. Prosecutors often decry the use of polygraph 
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evidence in favor of a defendant, citing the hypothetical influence of a friendly 
polygrapher (Honts, 1997). Friendly polygrapher theory supposes that the examiner 
creates a testing environment where the accused individual is capable of answering any 
question to best suit their case, such as not asking substantive questions of an accused 
robber, but attempting to claim a positive, non-deceptive result as indicative of 
innocence. Because the procedures of polygraph exams vary by agency and jurisdiction, 
as well as by examiner, prosecutors claim that any individual can find an examiner who 
would be able to give them exactly the results they need for a case (Honts, 1997). 
Despite this claim, Raskin and Kircher (2014) found little evidence to support this 
hypothesis and took issue with several of its presumptions. The authors disagreed that a 
so-called ‘friendly polygrapher’ would be able to entirely mitigate the stress and fear 
associated with polygraphs as no known jurisdiction allows differential reporting to 
courts (i.e., only reporting in the instances that suit one party). Individuals are advised 
that the results can be used even if it adversely affects their case before the pre-test 
interview takes place. Furthermore, even in these supposed friendly polygrapher 
environments, the subject of the test still has a great deal at stake. Results that indicate 
deception make it impossible for them to be used as a basis to dismiss the case. 
Individuals may also fear further increasing their legal costs and could quite easily be 
concerned about disrupting the relationship they have with their defense attorney (Raskin 
& Kircher, 2014). In order for an individual to ‘beat’ a CQT polygraph, they would have 
to show comparable rates of reaction to the control questions as they would to relevant 
questions, and the friendly polygrapher hypothesis fails to indicate how the purported 
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lack of concern would lead to the needed increase. All told, there is little support for the 
complaint, and it should be rejected as a reason to prohibit polygraphs (Honts, 1997). 
Honts and Quick (1995) discussed the permissibility of polygraph results in terms 
of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Even if the individual expressed 
a willingness to take the exam, it could still be prohibited due to not being direct 
‘physical evidence’ in the same vein as a pair of stolen jeans or on-site sobriety tests 
(Honts & Quick, 1995). There is not a Supreme Court case that delineates which class of 
evidence polygraphs best fit. In the North Dakota case of Wahpeton v. Skoog (1980), the 
appellate court ultimately ruled that field sobriety tests are not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, such that individuals may not invoke their right to silence or refusal without 
penalty. Because polygraphs do not deal with physical evidence, the North Dakota court 
continued in Wahpeton v. Skoog to hold that they could be prohibited under the Fifth 
Amendment without incurring penalty (Honts & Quick, 1995). 
Similar situations arise in post-conviction or incarceration-based hearings. In the 
case of Varnson v. Satran (1985), marijuana was found in the possession of one inmate 
during a search, and the inmate was promptly punished and lost his ‘good time’ credit. As 
part of the decision-making process, the parole board required that the inmate take and 
pass a polygraph to remain eligible for parole. The examiner, based on the results and 
their interpretations thereof, believed the inmate to be deceptive in the second of two 
polygraphs. The inmate appealed the loss of parole and explained that, in his belief, the 
parole board’s sole use of the polygraph as a factor in making the decision was 
impermissible (Honts & Quick, 1995). The appellate court ruled in favor of the parole 
board, finding that it was not unconstitutional for a polygraph exam to be made a 
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condition of parole. They also opined that the inmate’s contention of inherent inaccuracy 
and imperfection of the polygraph was erroneous and found that the decision had not 
been made solely on the basis of the polygraph results. This is similar to the standards 
suggested earlier; polygraphs can be considered as evidence if the results are able to be 
methodologically triangulated (Handler et al., 2009). 
Two main challenges arise where polygraph evidence is concerned. The first of 
the two calls into question the validity / competence of polygraph training. Honts and 
Perry (1992) found that polygraph examiners often lacked a background in psychology. 
Understanding interpretations of instrument-given statistics was also lacking, even in the 
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, or DODPI (Honts & Perry, 1992). It would 
be unfair and inaccurate to imply that no such improvements have occurred since that 
time. Indeed, changes have taken place and federal polygraphs are now overseen by a 
larger agency known as the Institute for Credentialing Excellence (ICE). This agency 
provides, in addition to training and accreditation resources, a national standard for areas 
of work which require specialized training or education. ICE is responsible for 
development and improvement of polygraph training and has legal authority to conduct 
audits of agencies to ensure they comply with the standards for continuing education and 
scientific rigor (Institute for Credentialing Excellence, n.d.). A problem that is more 
likely to still exist is the issue of a lack of standards across agencies. Part of this is no 
doubt a product of the fragmented structure of law enforcement agencies in the United 
States. Establishing a uniform set of procedures would likely require a federal court 
order, due to the influence of inter-agency politics and the de-centralized nature of 
American policing. Because of the influence of American political federalism, each 
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police department can have its own standards and be tailored to the desires and attitudes 
of the area it serves (Katz, 1997). 
The second issue concerning polygraph evidence is the possibility of 
countermeasures of various sorts. The most frequently-cited countermeasure is drugs. 
Theoretically, the alterations resulting from substance intake could ‘confuse’ the 
instrument and render the results inconclusive or inapplicable (Honts, 2014). However, 
even a cursory search on most academic databases discovered that there is a severe lack 
of information and research on drug countermeasures to polygraphs. Therefore, it was 
difficult to say with much certainty as to what effects drugs may have on polygraph 
efficacy. In terms of relatively obvious / basic indications of drug use (such as drowsiness 
or visible intoxication), Honts and Perry (1992) clarified that, not only do polygraph 
examiners ask beforehand whether an individual has consumed / used anything prior, the 
instruments are often capable of detecting what they are designed to measure even with a 
polygraph-beating substance present. Far more plausible as a problem is the presence of 
learned countermeasures. 
Honts and Perry (1992) found that, if individuals were trained in the methodology 
and science of polygraphs, they were much more capable of beating the exam. 
Individuals were taught to recognize control and relevant questions, were also given 
suggestions of subtle physical / mental countermeasures (e.g. mentally reciting the 
alphabet, or physically biting one’s tongue), and they used these in the control question 
section of tests. Employment of these learned countermeasures skewed the ‘baseline’ 
response and therefore made it difficult for the examiner to detect deception. In one such 
experiment, all the individuals who received this psychological training were able to beat 
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the exam. Typical polygraph examiners do not give these more legitimate 
countermeasures adequate weight (Honts & Perry, 1992). 
Countermeasures are not exclusively the tools of criminals. AntiPolygraph.org is 
a website that not only publishes articles discrediting and criticizing the polygraph, but 
also provides a 220-page book in digital form that explains various types of 
countermeasures in great detail (Maschke & Scalabrini, 2005). The first types of 
countermeasures that the book explained pertain to breathing. According to this book, 
polygraph examiners often have a ‘baseline’ of acceptance of anywhere from 15 – 30 
breaths per minute, with about three seconds between each exhalation. To throw off an 
examiner, one way to manipulate breathing is to simply block it shortly (i.e., hold one’s 
breath after exhaling for 4 – 5 seconds). The length of time that this block is present is 
crucial, as too long of a pause will likely be characterized as suspicious by the examiner 
(Maschke & Scalabrini, 2005). Another method of manipulation is decreasing the 
breathing rate for 5 – 15 seconds, ending before the next question is asked. For mental 
countermeasures, the authors suggested performing mental calculations or imagining 
oneself in extremely stressful or exciting situations (e.g., watching a volcano erupt, 
counting backwards from a random number in random intervals). Maschke and Scalabrini 
(2005) indicated that this should be done upon recognizing a control question or 
immediately after answering a control question. Physical countermeasures could be as 
simple as biting the tongue hard enough to cause pain, but not enough to bleed. This is 
marginally more difficult to do without being detected, but Maschke and Scalabrini 
(2005) specified that it too could have an effect on the accuracy of the polygraph. None 
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of the countermeasures listed by Maschke and Scalabrini (2005) required any specialized 
training or seemed impossible for a layperson to learn and employ. 
A more recent study by Honts (2014) specifically looked at countermeasures to 
the polygraph and analyses of their effects. It is likely that counters to the polygraph have 
greatly changed since the 1990s, and as such, the 2014 data set made it easier to apply 
towards a modern law enforcement agency. It is important that data continue to be 
collected on polygraphs and deception, because as Honts (2014) pointed out, the conflict 
between deceivers and those who seek to detect this deception is an ongoing ‘arms race’. 
Unfortunately, Honts (2014) indicated that much of the recent research on polygraphs 
had been done under the shroud of government classification and as such was not 
available for reference or discussion. 
One of the concepts analyzed by Honts (2014) was the utility of spontaneous 
countermeasures. These are what they sound like: on-the-spot attempts by the individual 
being questioned to circumvent or skew the results to inconclusiveness. A spontaneous 
countermeasure is any behavior or practice that an individual may employ in the belief 
that it will skew or render inconclusive the results of the polygraph, such as clenching the 
jaw or fists, or deliberately trying to think of nothing. Because spontaneous 
countermeasures are not often devised with the type of exam or instrument in mind, they 
are often easily detectable by examiners. Honts (2014) concluded that these were largely 
ineffective, both because the theory behind such countermeasures was lacking as well as 
examiners recognizing and addressing the countermeasure immediately. In a sub-study 
referenced, Raskin and Kircher (2014) found that among the guilty, usage of spontaneous 
countermeasures did not significantly raise the percentage of falsely negative tests. The 
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problem was magnified for innocent individuals who used one or more countermeasures: 
usage significantly increased their scores in a negative direction (Honts, 2014). 
Spontaneous countermeasures merit investigation, and the frequency of their 
usage that Honts (2014) detailed only emphasized the necessity to understand them. 
Previous research on this topic conducted by Honts, Raskin and Kircher (1987) analyzed 
the effectiveness of these spontaneous countermeasures. Guilty participants in these trials 
committed a mock crime and were administered a CQT about the mock crime. The total 
sample size in this experiment was 65, which is still relatively small and is cause for 
concern in regard to validity. Of the 65 subjects, 39 self-reported utilizing spontaneous 
measures to beat or distort the exam, a rate of 60% (Honts, Raskin, Kircher, and Hodes, 
1988). The polygraph evaluators who administered the exams had a rate of 80% correct 
identification, 3% incorrectly identified, and 17% inconclusive. In the opinion of Honts et 
al. (1988), while spontaneous countermeasures were common, they were ultimately 
rather ineffective in obscuring CQT results. 
A later study by Honts, Amato, and Gordon (2001) also analyzed the usage and 
viability of countermeasures. An advantage that this experiment had over the previous 
(Honts, Raskin, and Kircher, 1987) was that it also contained a control group of innocent 
individuals who did not commit the mock crime. Participants, similarly to the previous 
study, were administered a CQT pertaining to the crime, after which the examiner 
determined whether the individual had or had not been truthful. The sample size also 
improved, from 65 to 192, which was beneficial in terms of validity and reliability. Of 
this larger sample, half of the group was designated to be innocent while the other was 
guilty (Honts et al., 2001). The findings on spontaneous countermeasure use were similar 
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to the older study (Honts et al., 1987). Out of the 192 test subjects, 130 reported using 
some form of countermeasure in an attempt to obscure the results of the polygraph, a rate 
of 67.7% (Honts et al., 2001). Participants in the innocent test group reported relatively 
high usage of countermeasures, with 44 out of the 96 (equal to 45.8%) indicating that 
they had used one or more countermeasure. It was clear from these findings that 
spontaneous countermeasures did exist and that they were utilized by both the innocent 
and guilty. As expected, those within the guilty test group reported much higher rates of 
countermeasure usage, with 86 out of the 96 (equal to 89.6%) subjects (Honts et al., 
2001). Among both groups, mental countermeasures were reported to be the most 
common tool to circumvent the polygraph. Three instructors from the Department of 
Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) were asked to evaluate the exams not only to 
determine truth or deception, but also to report on whether they detected usage of 
countermeasures. Ultimately, Honts et al. (2001) found that detection of countermeasure 
use was far less promising than detection of deception. Between the three evaluators, 
only 44 identifications of countermeasure use were made out of the entire sample. Honts 
et al. (2001) summarized the state of countermeasure detection critically, saying that 
“none of the DODPI evaluators detected countermeasure use at better than chance levels” 
(p. 7). Not only was there a low level of detection among the evaluators, inter-rater 
agreement on identifying countermeasure use was also very low; that is, the evaluators 
often disagreed on which subjects were employing countermeasures (Honts et al., 2001). 
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002) also addressed the incidence and utility of polygraph 
countermeasures on the GKT when compared against the CQT. The problem of learned 
countermeasures that Honts and Perry (1992) explained was the predominant issue that 
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Ben-Shakhar et al. (2002) discussed. Especially today, with the availability of websites 
and information on polygraphs, it is quite easy to access information which theoretically 
could teach an individual how to beat a polygraph, and this is corroborated by the 
frequent theme in research of the power of education (Honts & Perry, 1992). Honts and 
Perry (1992) directly showed the potential skewing power of education on polygraph test 
administration. The importance of questions and responses was equal for both examiner 
and examinee. 
Honts (2014) found support for the power of misinformation on beating the 
polygraph. In this context, misinformation was the introduction of incorrect information 
occurring during the pre-test interview. For example, if a polygraph was administered in 
an investigation for a crime where the primary evidence was an eyewitness account, it 
was possible that the eyewitness may not remember the scene correctly (e.g., the getaway 
car was really red, but the witness reported it was gray). If this was the account the 
polygraph examiner was given and test questions were related to it, this would decrease 
the accuracy of the polygraph. In this hypothetical situation, even if the test subject did 
commit the crime, he / she could truthfully deny having seen the gray getaway car. 
Misinformation can also be done deliberately, where an examiner would develop test 
questions that emphasized a point the examiner knew was wrong. If the test subject’s 
memory was correct, yet they were repeatedly being detected as deceptive in regards to 
this detail, it would be possible that they relented and conceded that the examiner’s 
version of events was correct. Deliberate misinformation is less common, as it could be 
viewed as a form of entrapment against the individual. It is unsurprising, given 
criminology’s understanding of the flaws in human memory (Walsh, 2012), that having 
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erroneous information introduced could skew accuracy levels, even if the individual 
directly committed or witnessed the crime. Solely introducing misinformation had a 
significant impact on the levels of polygraph accuracy. In a study by Amato-Henderson, 
Honts, and Plaud (1996), introduction of misinformation resulted in a majority of guilty 
respondents incorrectly being labelled as truthful by the polygraph. Innocent suspects 
who happened to possess crime-relevant information (frequently by witnessing it 
themselves) also were endangered by the introduction of misinformation (Honts, 2014). 
According to Rovner (1986), introduction of pre-exam information influenced 
polygraph accuracy rates. As other research has indicated, individuals who were well-
versed in the sort of exam they were about to be subjected to often were better able to be 
deceptive without being detected. While an examiner frequently asks what the subject has 
heard or knows about polygraphs, they do this primarily to counter arguments or allay the 
fears of the subject. It would be unlikely that trained examiners would disclose too much 
of the formatting of the test because they know of the risks, but Rovner (1986) found that 
this pre-test disclosure and conversation may itself be a risk factor in terms of accuracy. 
While justice system transparency is not a problem, the wider availability of information 
and required disclosure from one party to another does bring with it greater public 
understanding of basic concepts of polygraph theory and testing formats. 
In scientific experimentation, it is useful to separate the experimental group into 
two sub-groups. In Rovner’s (1986) study, the control group was not given any relevant 
materials before the administration of the test, but one of the experimental subgroups was 
given a loose-leaf notebook with detailed information regarding the theory of the test, the 
data / patterns that an examiner may use to make their decision, and a list of 
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countermeasures that could potentially skew the responses. The second subgroup was 
given access to this notebook of information, but was also told what model of polygraph 
instrument was being used and what it detected, as well as given two practice tests before 
the ‘guilt’ test. The question order remained the same on both practice tests. After these 
practice runs, the second subgroup also was allowed to examine the results and discuss 
them with the polygrapher (Rovner, 1986). The author had the results of the official exam 
scored by a third examiner who was not present during any of the tests. 
Rovner (1986) discovered that solely being presented with information on the 
theory of the test had no significant effect on accuracy levels. Rates of accuracy for both 
the control and information groups were approximately 91.5% correctly identified, 8.3% 
incorrectly identified, and only 0.2% gave inconclusive results. However, for the group 
who was given information in addition to two practice exams, the rates were significantly 
lower: 70.8% correct identifications and 29.2% incorrectly identified. It is true that 70% 
is still a rather large majority, but any concerns present with even an 8.3% error rate 
should significantly increase with an error rate almost four times higher. Rovner (1986) 
found a high level of interrater reliability for his methodology via comparing the 
decisions made by the examiners and the independent evaluator. Both had very high 
levels of definite decision-making, 93% for the administering examiner and 90% for the 
evaluator. On the subjects analyzed by both an examiner and the independent evaluator, 
the rate of agreement rose to 95%. Numerical result comparisons between the examiners 
and evaluators had an extremely strong correlation: (r = 0.97) (Rovner, 1986). 
For future researchers, Rovner (1986) had a few suggestions and conceded some 
limitations to his study. One factor that remains true today and applies to virtually all 
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crime research is the necessity of creating a realistic scenario for the test subject. 
Understandably, there cannot be realistically severe consequences, but a bit of deception 
appears to be necessary in shaping a realistic environment. Rovner (1986) incentivized 
taking the test by offering a small cash compensation for participation as well as an 
additional reward for those who successfully managed to beat the polygraph. 
Amato-Henderson, Honts and Plaud (1996) researched the impact of 
misinformation on guilty knowledge test (GKT) polygraphs. The total sample size was 
between the older study (Honts et al., 1988) and the more modern Honts (2014) study, at 
96 participants. The methodology was slightly different than the other studies. Instead of 
committing a mock crime, test subjects watched a videotaped crime in order to induce 
guilt (Amato-Henderson, Honts, & Plaud, 1996). After a week, test subjects were given 
deliberate misinformation regarding certain facts of the crime, administered a GKT 
polygraph regarding three misinformed facts, three un-altered facts, and after completion, 
all respondents took a 20-question test regarding the crime. Misinformation was 
determined to be successful if it resulted in a higher likelihood of being designated as 
innocent (Amato-Henderson, Honts, & Plaud, 1996). Logically, it stands to reason that 
introducing erroneous information could negatively impact the veracity of a polygraph 
exam, and this was the result that Amato-Henderson et al. (1996) discovered. On the 
GKT polygraph, 52 of the 92 test subjects (56.5%) were incorrectly identified as being 
truthful about their innocence, while only 40 of the 92 (43.5%) were still correctly 
identified as guilty. From this data, it was readily apparent that misinformation impairs 
the accuracy of a GKT polygraph exam (Amato-Henderson et al., 1996). 
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The length of time that passes between the crime and the polygraph exam is also a 
risk factor against accurate results. Every recall of a memory places it at risk for 
alteration (Honts, 2014). Over time, various forms of misinformation could sufficiently 
alter a memory so that it is completely devoid of fact, though the individual does not 
believe it to be. While no pharmaceutical company is likely to produce a drug specifically 
tailored to help people circumvent the polygraph, Honts (2014) cautioned that the side 
effects of certain drugs help degrade the memory quality of certain events. If an 
individual was facing a polygraph and knew they had relevant knowledge, all they would 
need to do to bolster their chances of circumventing the polygraph is to recall as much as 
they can regarding the event, take the prescribed drug, and wait. The memory is all but 
guaranteed to degrade in quality or possibly even be erased. However, such substances 
should not be considered solely criminal aids, as Honts (2014) spoke of their use in 
treating post-traumatic stress disorder and drug addiction. Further research is needed to 
determine the levels of influence these pharmacological drugs have and how best to 
screen for them. 
When it comes to detecting the use of countermeasures, the numbers are 
disturbingly low. Part of the problem is that, as soon as one particular countermeasure is 
detected and accounted for, another one may take its place (Honts, 2014). More so, it is 
very unlikely that accurate counter-countermeasures can be developed for mental 
countermeasures, since the medical field does not fully understand or have a way to fully 
pictorialize the process of recall. Relying solely on examiners to identify usage is 
demonstrably inadequate, as evidenced by Honts et al. (2001). Worse so, Honts (2014) 
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illustrated that as much as 48% of the individuals accused of using countermeasures were 
actually innocent. 
While it is conceded that polygraph instruments can detect what they are designed 
to, Honts (2014) also indicated examiners could be inadequate when it comes to detecting 
deceptive behaviors. According to Honts (2014), some of what examiners may interpret 
as overt signs of deception (e.g., shuffling feet, shifting eyes) is actually natural behaviors 
displayed by innocent people. For anyone who has sat through a polygraph, even in a 
non-criminal context, the procedure is often very stressful. An individual who feels 
nervous in a polygraph situation may fidget or display other physical signs of 
nervousness, and if the instrument identified these movements as deceptive, it is possible 
that an innocent individual could be wrongly accused of committing a crime or lying to 
the polygraph examiner. Unless the U.S. government adopts a more “enlightened 
attitude” towards polygraphs and polygraph research, Honts (2014) saw little likelihood 
that scientists would be able to make much progress. 
Honts and Quick (1995) explored the disadvantages of the most common type of 
polygraph exam (CQT). The level of disagreement over the merits and flaws of the CQT 
was described as a “polemic controversy” (Honts & Quick, 1995, p. 6). The CQT exam 
asks test subjects two types of questions: those relevant to the matter under investigation 
and those that are not. The test suggests that innocent individuals, because they do not 
have any knowledge of the subject of investigation, will have greater physiological 
responses to the control questions (Honts & Quick, 1995). Detractors of the CQT, at the 
core, accuse the test premise of being naïve. Critics claim that no examiner can formulate 
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control questions with as much psychological impact as relevant questions to serious 
crimes (Honts & Quick, 1995). 
Much more interesting were Honts and Quick’s (1995) conclusions regarding the 
issues of polygraph research. While laboratory research is often desirable, it can be 
difficult, especially where crime is concerned, to truly ‘replicate’ in a sterilized setting. 
Because of the lack of standards in polygraph examinations, the way that the researchers 
conduct the exam may be different than the way the local police agency conducts theirs. 
Additionally, it would be difficult if not impossible to replicate the seriousness of the 
consequences that are present in a real-world polygraph. Individuals in a lab experiment 
would be unlikely, even if specifically instructed, to treat the exam as if they were in a 
real-world scenario, which can influence the validity of the results. Furthermore, there is 
difficulty in ascertaining a baseline from which to compare responses to, especially when 
dealing with relatively abstract concepts such as truth (Honts & Quick, 1995). There are 
issues with confessions and polygraphs, and Honts and Quick (1995) explained that, in 
some cases, police can be more concerned with obtaining a confession rather than 
conducting a proper polygraph examination, which could diminish the sense of 
objectivity that accreditation agencies often have as a requirement. 
Raskin and Kircher (2014) researched the issue of human error intrinsic in 
polygraphs. While the subjectivity in examiner interpretations of results was present 
already, the authors raised a valid question about the mental and emotional state of the 
subject. Given the differences in personality, it does not strain the imagination to think 
that a psychopath might have less of an issue lying. One proposed solution to this is 
allowing computers to score and interpret the majority of polygraph data, as well as to 
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gather and compare trends in multiple exams (Raskin & Kircher, 2014). This appears to 
be a very strong suggestion to increase the validity of results. Statistical aggregation 
allows researchers to draw inferences about trends that are not observable from one case 
or a small number. Raskin and Kircher (2014) found that computer algorithms have 
accuracy that is at worst comparable to skilled interpreters and at best better than these 
interpreters. Unsurprisingly, the one class of mental disorders that has an uncontrolled 
influence on polygraph veracity is full-blown psychosis. While these individuals may be 
better able to circumvent the polygraph, the other symptoms of psychosis (i.e., 
hallucinations, delusions, and catatonia) often make them identifiable during the pre-test 
interview. Raskin and Kircher (2014) found that, despite the face validity of psychopaths 
being able to lie on an exam, the actual results did not show much strength for this 
connection. 
Handler et al. (2009) indicated that the lack of consistency in polygraph literature 
and methodology extends to the interpretation and conclusion-forming of results as well. 
The most common way this occurs is termed global analysis (Handler et al., 2009), where 
the examiner directly inspects the test results for physiological responses or trends in 
responses to a particular question or two. The limitations of this are obvious: it introduces 
examiner subjectivity and is almost entirely dependent on the examiner’s ability to 
recognize visual patterns from the available data. Increasingly frequent is the utilization 
of numerical scoring (Handler et al., 2009, p. 7), in which examiners run basic statistics 
on the data to compare magnitude and assign objectively-defined scores, with cutoffs at 
certain levels specifically delineated as truthful, deceptive, or otherwise. In a criminal 
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investigation, an inconclusive result on a polygraph exam often results in a re-test, where 
the rates of inconclusive results tend to drop (Handler et al., 2009).  
In looking at the 2011 American Polygraph Association (APA) meta-analysis 
data, Honts (2013) found that rates of inconclusive results were actually higher for 
innocent individuals compared to the guilty. That is, individuals who did not commit the 
crime had a higher probability of an inconclusive score than the person or persons who 
did commit the crime. The APA’s reported rates for the most accurate and stringently-
administered forensic polygraph exams were rather subpar: a false positive rate of 13.8%, 
false negative rate of 3.4%, innocent yet inconclusive rate of 25.5%, and guilty yet 
inconclusive rates of 3.4%. This must be considered with the caveat that all inconclusive 
results were treated as indicative of deception. Honts (2013) included this in his analysis, 
and while he found that removing all such cases did not have an influence on the 
confidence of a non-deceptive result, it decreased the likelihood of obtaining a true 
deceptive result to 71.3%. In his own words, treating all inconclusive results identically 
to guilty results ultimately “has no effect on the confidence in a truthful outcome” 
(Honts, 2013, p. 2). The additional interrogation of innocent individuals whose results 
were inconclusive had no statistical impact on how confident the ultimate decision may 
be. 
With the push for judges and all participants in the justice system to make 
evidenced-based decisions, this is a rate that merits concern (What is EBDM?, 2017). 
Roughly 30% of the time, the polygraph may be wrongfully impugning an individual’s 
character or recalled actions. While there is no specific number that determines what is 
permissible under the Daubert test, it seems doubtful that this would meet that criteria or 
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be considered something that could be trusted beyond a reasonable doubt as is the rule for 
criminal court decision-making (Honts, 2013). 
While polygraph result interpretation is not strictly tied to court permissibility, it 
is also worth considering in terms of resource allocation. Because every criminal justice 
agency (even at the federal level) must contend with a limited quantity of dollars and 
employees, it is imperative that the practices employed by these agencies be effective, 
efficient, and financially viable. Honts (2013) found that the opposite was true for the 
inconclusive-as-deceptive approach to interrogation and criminal polygraphing. The 
number of innocent individuals who were needlessly interrogated due to an inconclusive 
result increased by an astonishing 190%, while the rates of guilty individuals who were 
brought in for further interrogation increased by only 15% (Honts, 2013). English jurist 
William Blackstone (1778) wrote in his magnum opus that, “the law holds it better that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party should suffer” (Blackstone, 1778, 
p. 713), a goal that seems to be in direct conflict with this practice. 
The polygraph is obviously in a tenuous position in terms of permissibility in the 
courtroom, since the standards and regulations vary across the states and levels of 
government. In the armed forces, the Military Rule of Evidence 707 forbids the usage of 
polygraphs in all court-martials, on the basis of Frye test failure and inaccuracy (Military 
Rules of Evidence 707, 2015). Upon initial draft in 1991, then-President George H.W. 
Bush interpreted the language as a “per se ban on all polygraph evidence in courts-
martial”, and this interpretation was de facto accepted as law for seven years (Military 
Rules of Evidence 707, 2015). This issue was litigated to the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
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case of U.S. v. Scheffer (1998), where the Court held that such a ban on evidence did not 
violate the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to present a defense.  
There exists one major caveat to this ruling that must be understood. In U.S. v. 
Scheffer (1998), the justices specified that the previous hard-line prohibition on 
polygraph was not necessary; judges could still make a determination on a case-by-case 
basis per Daubert. Currently, the U.S. military still abides by the Military Rules of 
Evidence, including 707, which technically bars the inclusion of polygraph evidence in 
proceedings (Military Rules of Evidence 707, 2015). Because of the inconsistency in the 
literature, it is doubtful that many judges in courts-martial are likely to make any changes 
or rulings that stray from 707 regulations. While there are, of course, differences between 
military courts and civilian criminal matters, this is certainly a relevant case law to 
consider. The polygraph is a singular part of the overall criminal justice system process, 
though its results can be felt in all three stages (i.e., police custody, court proceedings, 
and corrections). The method and environment of the police-administered polygraph may 
impact its permissibility and relative credence among the jurors, whose decision can then 
result in further litigation after trial dispensation. Thus, it is important that there be a 
basic understanding of the public’s view of the justice system. 
Perceptions of the Justice System 
Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) analyzed the different perceptions of procedural and 
structural fairness of the justice system. American public opinion of the police has always 
been divided. In Hurwitz and Peffley’s (2005) own words, “whites believe the criminal 
justice system is fundamentally fair, and most African-Americans do not” (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 2005, p. 3). It is imperative to understand why such differences exist and what 
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influence they can have on the efficacy of the justice system. This concept is not unique 
to criminology and can be just as easily applied to the economic system in the U.S. as 
well: whites see mostly fairness and equal-opportunity, while African-Americans see 
neither (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). While understanding these viewpoints and what 
events develop them is important, Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) indicated that most 
research on the topic did not branch between both sides: i.e., data were collected from 
mostly whites or mostly blacks in single studies, with relatively few achieving equal 
interracial comparison. These comparative studies are useful as references, because they 
allow members of the majority and minority groups to see what contributes to these 
different opinions. It is the lack of understanding and inability to see the others’ 
perspective that makes criminal justice policy and events as controversial as they 
sometimes are. 
Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) drew data from the 2005 National Race and Crime 
Survey, which was a nation-wide random-digit telephone survey. The total sample size 
was large enough to mitigate concerns over representativeness or generalizability (N = 
1182). Not surprisingly, the data clearly supported the initial hypothesis on greater 
skepticism amongst African-Americans compared to whites. Over 67% of the African-
Americans surveyed believed that the justice system does not treat people fairly and 
equally, where only 35.2% of whites shared this cynicism (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). 
These broad opinions of the justice system influenced the way that respondents perceived 
following situations in the survey. When asked to judge a hypothetical situation of police 
brutality, white respondents tended to judge slightly less punitively when the victim was 
white as opposed to black. Similarly, in a stop-and-frisk situation, whites were marginally 
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more likely to side with the police if an arrest was made. Blacks who believed that the 
system was fundamentally unfair were more likely to view all such hypotheticals 
skeptically, siding with the victims more often than the police. Perhaps most surprising of 
all, Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) found that whites have a rather naïve view of racial 
impact in the justice system. It is readily apparent that races are treated differently in the 
justice system, but whites in Hurwitz and Peffley’s (2005) sample seemed unaware of 
this phenomenon. 
Skewed perceptions are not restricted to ideas on racial discrimination. For 
example, many proponents of the death penalty believe that the sentence is faster and that 
it is not worth taxpayers’ dollars to keep inmates alive for years on end, but this is 
demonstrably false because it does not take into account the cost (both time and money) 
of guaranteed appeals all death row prisoners are entitled to. Marcus (2007) indicated 
that, while the U.S. still has a relatively high number of individuals on death row, these 
numbers included those “whose appeals and legal petitions have been pending for many 
years” (Marcus, 2007, p. 10). Until these appeals are heard by a court, the state is 
prohibited from executing the inmate, even if the inmate refuses to file any appeals 
themselves. Death row prisoners in the U.S. can expect to remain incarcerated for several 
years before a major change in their case occurs, and all this time they incur the same 
costs of a life-without-parole prisoner (Marcus, 2007). 
The public also has an incorrect idea of the purpose and environment of drug and 
specialty courts, believing that they are easy and soft routes for offenders to get out of the 
justice system quickly. In reality, the opposite is true: specialty courts often require a 
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vetting process for a candidate that analyzes their potential for reformation through 
alternative treatment (Goodfellow & Kilgore, 2013). 
Unfortunately, individual perceptions of the justice system are out of touch. 
Kozinski (2015) opined that, while the public pretends otherwise, “much of what we do 
in the law is guesswork” (Kozinski, 2015, p. 1). One of the ways to counter these 
incorrect assumptions is through education. While no one can be compelled to educate 
themselves on criminal justice, those who select it as a field of study can be researched, 
and this was the relationship analyzed by Tsoudis (2000). She sought to determine the 
strength of the connection between choosing a criminal justice major and overall view of 
the justice system. To accomplish this, Tsoudis (2000) surveyed 200 students at a 
Midwestern college. In this sample, 99 respondents were criminal justice majors and 101 
were non-CJ majors. The survey was administered during class and included questions on 
attitudes pertaining to crime, beliefs relating to crime, corrections philosophy, and the 
overall role of the justice system and its actors. To emphasize the importance of this 
study, Tsoudis (2000) highlighted that, while criminal justice majors are often the 
administrators, staff, and workers in the system, the larger public still has a fairly 
significant impact on criminal justice. Because legislators, at least theoretically, represent 
their constituents, they are likely to be sensitive to the desires of those voting individuals. 
Tsoudis (2000) gave the example of the death penalty, explaining that, despite there 
being a lack of empirical support for its supposed deterrent effect on crime, the public 
still looks upon the practice favorably. 
Ultimately, Tsoudis (2000) discovered that those who were criminal justice 
majors held four significantly different beliefs regarding the justice system. First, they 
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were less supportive of harsh punishment and lengthy sentences. Second, criminal justice 
majors were more accepting of protection of criminals’ rights before and after the trial 
process. Third, they believed strongly that criminal punishments should not vary by race. 
Fourth, criminal justice majors were more supportive of a separate juvenile justice system 
and different philosophical approach for juveniles than were other students (Tsoudis, 
2000). 
Perceptions of Crime and Sentencing 
Roberts and Doob (1990) also analyzed the impact of media on public perceptions 
of crime. Because murder, rape and other extreme crimes often saturate the news cycle, 
the public is only ever exposed to the worst of crime and therefore has a much more 
severe picture of crime than really occurs. This, when brought up to legislators, results in 
the ultra-punitive set of penalties for many relatively minor crimes that are still common 
in the U.S. (Roberts & Doob, 1990). Roberts and Doob (1990) found that, while murder 
accounted for only 1% of all crimes, it was the topic for 25% of all crime stories. Among 
news media in the U.S., roughly one in five news stories covered violent crime, when 
only 6% of total crime was actually violent (Roberts & Doob, 1990). This was clearly out 
of touch with reality, yet it was the version of events that ~95% of people reported as 
their first source of information on crime. 
The primary topic of study for Costelloe, Chiricos and Gertz (2007) was 
determining the extent to which this discontent and dissatisfaction was statistically tied to 
more aggressive policies on crime. A survey was conducted among 2,250 randomly-
selected Florida residents, who were interviewed at various points between October and 
December 1997. The sample demographic closely mirrored actual state demographics in 
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every respect except for mean age, which was approximately four years older than the 
state average of 38 years of age. To measure opinion harshness, respondents were asked 
to rate on a 1 – 10 scale (1 being little to none, 10 being almost complete) their support 
for various punitive crime policies, including support for the death penalty, chemical 
castration for sex offenders, and limiting death penalty appeals. In measuring fear of 
crime, respondents stated whether they were fearful of being the victims of certain violent 
crimes (Costelloe et al., 2007). 
Surprisingly, Costelloe et al. (2007) found that fear of crime was a stronger 
predictor of punitive opinion than actual criminal victimization among both males and 
females. Marriage was also found to be a significant predictor of punitive attitudes, 
especially for women. The data did not support the authors’ hypothesis on economic 
insecurity and dissatisfaction among any age or sex group. Economic insecurity did have 
an effect on the attitudes of white respondents; when they expected their economic 
situation to worsen in the coming year, respondents held significantly more punitive 
opinions of the criminal justice system (Costelloe et al., 2007). The impact of education 
also varied between ethnicities. For black and Hispanic respondents, increased education 
led to less punitive views but harsher opinions among whites. In conclusion, Costelloe et 
al. (2007) agreed with the concept of the “angry white male” when it related to economic 
dissatisfaction leading to more draconian crime policy (p. 18). 
The continuous exposure to heinous crimes from the media leads to the 
development of increased fear of crime. A consequence of increased public fear can be 
observed in the trend towards punitive sanctions. Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2007) 
examined other factors that contributed to the development of harsh public opinion. The 
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gravity of the situation was apparent, as Costelloe et al. (2007) illustrated that, between 
1986 and 2006, the total population of incarcerated individuals rose by 77%. There were 
multiple legal practices that contributed to this enormous surge in jail and prison 
population. Costelloe et al. (2007) highlighted a few examples of such policies, including 
the increased frequency of juvenile waiver to adult courts, the expansion of “three 
strikes” and habitual offender laws, and extremely harsh sentences for even non-violent 
drug offenses. Despite these facts, 65% of Americans in 2006 felt that the court system 
was still too lenient on offenders (Costelloe et al., 2007). 
Exposure and response to a violent crime-saturated media are only part of what 
could contribute to the draconian public perspective. Costelloe et al. (2007) hypothesized 
that individuals have become increasingly dissatisfied with the state’s inability to provide 
physical or economic security, and that this discontent finds an outlet in implementing 
harsh policies against a “ready-made, deeply unpopular target population”, that is, 
criminals (p. 2). Due to increasing deindustrialization, American companies face 
immense economic pressure to outsource jobs to locations where they are more 
profitable. The market for unskilled labor in the U.S. has dropped considerably since the 
1980s and continues to recede today. Wages, benefits, and pensions have also shrunk in 
this time, and to no surprise, the workforce is largely displeased with these changes 
(Costelloe et al., 2007). In short, due to the loss of economic mobility, and a lack of other 
outlets for such displeasure, Costelloe et al. (2007) believed that the public used harsh 
criminal punishments as a proxy for success to compensate for their frustration in being 
unable to move up the social ladder. 
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Nevertheless, the findings of Costelloe et al. (2007) did not go entirely 
unchallenged. McCorkle (1993) emphasized that the public is not universally supportive 
of punishing certain types of offenders, most frequently juveniles and to a lesser extent 
the poor and minorities. The public is cognizant that income has a significant impact on 
an individual’s progress through the justice system, and lack of income can unfairly 
prejudice or disadvantage a poor defendant. The existence of a separate juvenile justice 
system is evidence that society does not see all offenders equally (McCorkle, 1993). 
Because of their younger age and perceived malleability, juveniles enjoy a number of 
protections that adults do not receive, among them the closure of nearly all juvenile court 
proceedings to the public. Judicial records for adults are often publicly accessible and can 
be looked up on case repositories or at courthouses, where some states close juvenile 
records, only allowing them to be opened with a court order (Sha Sha & Fine, 2014). 
McCorkle (1993) did agree that, overall, the American public has a strong desire 
for punishment of criminal offenders, but tempered this statement with the addition that 
many “appear to recognize the limits of a purely punitive response to the crime problem” 
(McCorkle, 1993, p. 2). To obtain a better picture of public sentiment on the criminal 
justice system, McCorkle (1993) conducted a telephone survey of 967 adults in the Las 
Vegas area. Response rates to this survey were low, as only approximately 41% of the 
total sample actually answered the survey questions. Despite the low response rate, the 
median characteristics of the sample (i.e., majority white, nearly equal distribution by 
sex, various levels of education and income) were close to the demographics of the area 
and similar to those used in previous public opinion research. Respondents were 
presented with an example crime situation and then asked for their opinions on various 
48 
 
 
justice system practices in use and whether they believed changes needed to be made in 
how such cases were handled (McCorkle, 1993).  
While the overall findings were still rather punitive, the average opinion was 
nuanced in a way that is not adequately represented by the public official who promotes a 
straightforward “get tough on crime” policy. For less serious crimes such as drug 
possession, McCorkle (1993) discovered that his respondents were fairly supportive of 
rehabilitative policies and programs for this offender and did not believe incarceration 
was the only acceptable response. Even this support was moderated somewhat, though, as 
McCorkle (1993) simultaneously found that his respondents preferred rehabilitative 
efforts and programs to take place in correctional settings. Even in McCorkle’s (1993) 
time, prisons and other facilities were often plagued with their own issues of crime, 
which forced staff and educators to direct most of their efforts first towards maintaining 
control. 
Rossi, Berk, and Campbell (1997) observed similar results to that of McCorkle 
(1993). The only area where public opinion appeared to differ sharply from practiced law 
was in the different punishments meted out to drug offenders based on the drug they were 
abusing. Rossi et al. (1997) used a national survey of American adults and compared their 
responses to certain parts of federal sentencing guidelines. Each participant was asked to 
judge approximately 40 vignettes covering a variety of crimes ranging from “felon 
improperly owning a firearm” to “kidnapping, with victim being killed” (p. 9). Perhaps 
promisingly, respondents in this study displayed no significant variation in sentences 
based on extra-judicial factors such as defendant’s gender or employment history. Even 
prior record, one of the strongest actual predictors of future offending, was noted to have 
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only a moderate impact on sentence rates. Average sentence length across all crimes was 
approximately seven years. Rossi et al. (1997) learned that the longest sentences tended 
to be given for street crimes where one or more victims were killed. However, there was 
almost no support whatsoever for long sentences against drug offenders. This increased 
tolerance applied across all drugs, which was particularly unusual when compared against 
the federal guidelines. 
Perceptions of Courts 
Sentence length is not the only aspect of court function that citizens analyze, as 
they previously have raised concerns over the courts’ treatment of victims. The 
importance of having a positive public view of the courts is paramount, as there is a 
dependency between the two for optimal function. The public needs the courts to “punish 
offenders so that others are not victimized” (Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999, p. 3). The 
courts also require willing citizen participants to serve as faithful witnesses and objective 
jurors (Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999). 
Wood (2009) explained that the importance of citizen participation and opinion 
goes beyond their functions within the system. To be clear, witness cooperation and juror 
work are some of the most important functions that citizens can serve in the justice 
system, because if they did not do so, it would be highly likely that the system would be 
unable to function. Public opinion and satisfaction are equally important to the 
government, because ensuring that citizens feel their voices are heard and responded to 
are primary ways that governments obtain legitimacy. With this in mind, a degree of 
back-and-forth communication between the state and its population is inevitable and 
desirable. Wood (2009) indicated that police departments must not only tailor their 
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policies and responses relative to the level of committed crime, but also must take into 
consideration the level of fear of crime. 
Because of the demographic variety in the United States, it is not always accurate 
to identify one specific opinion as being the public opinion. Members of the public have 
attacked the courts because they believed that sentences were too lenient and did not 
sufficiently punish offenders (Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999). Blacks, in particular, 
expressed greater concern regarding the courts’ fairness to offenders and victims than did 
members of other racial groups (Kaukinen & Colavecchia, 1999). Once again, income 
also had an impact on perceptions, where citizens whose household income was near the 
poverty line expressed similar skepticism regarding the equality of the court process, 
believing that the results of a case could be strongly influenced by income (Reiman & 
Leighton, 2013). Reiman and Leighton (2013) wrote extensively on the problems of 
economic inequality and its effects on the justice system, titling the book, The Rich Get 
Richer, and the Poor Get Prison. One of the most noticeable disadvantages of low 
income in the justice system that Reiman and Leighton (2013) noted was the extreme 
difficulty of making bond before trial. The potential for further problems from failure to 
make bond was clear: difficulty in retaining employment, disruption of family affairs and 
security, and restricted ability to meet with attorneys. 
In contrast, polygraphs appear less prone to the unbalancing influence of income. 
Wealthy individuals do not possess inherent abilities to deceive or lie compared to poor 
individuals. However, as Honts (2014) and others stated, information and knowledge of 
polygraph techniques resulted in greater instrument inaccuracy. An individual’s access to 
such information and resources would be susceptible to the biasing effects of income: i.e., 
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individuals unable to make bond would be less likely to have time to specifically analyze 
polygraph exam formats. 
Citizen Opinion on Polygraphs in Comparison 
Myers et al. (2006) researched one of the foundational questions studied in this 
thesis: the comparative weight that jurors gave to polygraph evidence, compared to other 
types of evidence. The primary hypothesis was that jurors tend to consider polygraph 
results a very significant indication of guilt. They conducted a survey among a sample of 
411 randomly-selected individuals in California. Each participant was given a mock trial 
vignette on which they decided guilt or innocence; assignment to each type of polygraph 
evidence was done randomly. A post-test questionnaire was administered to each 
respondent, involving guilt or innocence, as well as a probability of commission (Myers 
et al., 2006). 
The research was much more in-depth than merely inquiring in regards to guilt 
and probability. Respondents first rendered a verdict based on the information from the 
trial vignette. They then graded their confidence in their verdict on a percentage scale 
from 0 – 100%. All of Myers et al. (2006) survey participants answered a question on the 
accuracy and usage of CQT-based polygraphs. For the members of the sample whose trial 
vignettes included polygraph evidence, they were asked how they viewed polygraph 
accuracy in general, graded on the same 0 – 100% scale. The group with polygraph 
evidence was asked on a five-point scale to grade its influence on their decision, which 
ranged from zero to four. All respondents were asked if they believed that polygraph 
examiners should be allowed in court to testify on clarifying the interpretations of the 
evidence; that is, whether defendants were truthful or deceitful as detected by the 
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instrument. Respondents answered where they believed the polygraph should fit in a 
courtroom setting. These responses were “sufficiently reliable to be the sole 
determinant”, “useful diagnostic tool when considered with other available information”, 
“of questionable usefulness, entitled to little weight against other information”, and “of 
no usefulness” (p. 8). To assess relative weight, Myers et al. (2006) asked respondents to 
rank polygraph evidence compared with four other types: fingerprints, DNA, eyewitness, 
and handwriting. Finally, respondents were asked to complete questions on non-criminal 
information, primarily regarding their demographics (Myers et al., 2006). 
In testing the hypothesis that jurors defer heavily to polygraphs, the percentage of 
convictions was first analyzed (Myers et al., 2006). Out of the 411 participants in the 
study, those who received negative results (indicating the accused had taken and failed an 
exam), 71.9% voted to convict. For those whose vignettes indicated a positive result 
(accused had taken and passed a polygraph), 59.1% voted to convict. Of the group who 
had no polygraph evidence, 70% voted to convict. It is apparent that there was a 
difference between negative and positive results, but it was not immediately clear as to 
whether Myers et al.’s (2006) hypothesis was supported. A chi-square test of 
independence was conducted to determine whether the presentation of polygraph 
evidence had a statistically significant impact on verdict. Myers et al. (2006) stated in 
their analysis that these tests did not show statistical significance. The mere presentation 
of polygraph evidence did not significantly impact the decision to convict or not to 
convict. To corroborate this finding, the authors also conducted a one-way ANOVA on 
the verdict to determine if accessibility of evidence had an impact. The ANOVA showed 
that access to polygraph evidence was not statistically significant in predicting verdicts. It 
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was clear from the analyses of Myers et al. (2006) that accessibility to polygraph 
evidence by itself did not have a significant effect on verdict decisions. The issue in 
previous studies on polygraphs of sample size was also less problematic here, with (N = 
411), which supported its internal validity. The use of a random public sample in Myers 
et al. (2006) increased its external validity. 
In regards to the question measuring confidence in the polygraph, every 
respondent was informed of the polygraph having an estimated accuracy of 85%, which 
is relatively close to the 80% rate of correct identification put forth by Honts et al. (1988). 
Even with this information, both the failed-polygraph and passed-polygraph groups 
reported lower degrees of confidence in polygraph evidence: 68% and 62% respectively 
(Myers et al., 2006). The difference between these two ratings was not found to be 
statistically significant. When these participants were asked how the evidence impacted 
their decision on the five-point scale, there was not a statistically significant difference 
between the failed-polygraph and passed-polygraph groups. Myers et al. (2006) also 
tested whether education and age had an impact on perceived polygraph credence. For 
both variables, there was no significant difference between passed-polygraph and failed-
polygraph groups. Education did not lead to higher skepticism towards the polygraph, 
and neither did older participants display significantly different opinions from younger 
participants on the accuracy of the polygraph (Myers et al., 2006). Whatever 
misperceptions may exist among potential jurors do not appear to be concentrated in any 
one group of age or education. On the other hand, the insignificant effect of education 
could prove problematic in correcting any misguided beliefs. 
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Myers et al. (2006) also researched the respondents’ perceived appropriate role 
for the polygraph in a courtroom. Out of the entire sample, only 4.2% believed that a 
polygraph could be a singular deciding factor, 62.5% described it as being a useful tool, 
25.5% expressed reservations about the practice but conceded a use existed for it, and 
7.8% believed it had no usefulness at all (Myers et al., 2006). This is scarcely the 
overwhelming deference that critics of polygraphs in the courtrooms would accuse jurors 
of having toward the polygraph. Iacono and Lykken (1997) had earlier surveyed two 
groups of scientists and experts on the question of polygraphs in the courtroom, and 
Myers et al. (2006) compared their results to this older survey. In their analysis, they 
found that the opinions of laypeople and non-professionals differed significantly from the 
opinions of experts. Myers et al. (2006) found that laypersons had significantly higher 
opinions of polygraphs (average opinion of 66.7% accuracy) than did experts (average 
opinion of 44% accuracy). While the difference was significant, it is worth noting that 
neither rises to the 85% that respondents were informed of before the survey was 
administered. 
In summary, academic and professional opinions of the polygraph are mixed. 
Despite improvement in examiner training, instrument refinement, and post-test analysis, 
critics of the polygraph have attacked its potential for error and argued that it still is not 
accurate or reliable enough to have a place in the justice system (Gallai, 1999). The court 
history of the polygraph has been dominated by these negative opinions, and it was only 
recently (i.e., within the last 20 – 25 years) that the instrument found even niche 
acceptance among the judiciary (Lee v. Martinez, 2004). Supporters of the polygraph 
argue that its potential value outweighs the possibility of error, and that it is no longer 
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justified to deny the instrument its place due to old case history (Ben-Shakhar et al., 
2002). Because of government classification of most polygraph research, there is 
relatively little information and study on polygraphs in comparison to public opinions on 
the courts or the justice system in general. This thesis addressed this lack of study and 
provided a valuable insight into a topic worthy of further research. 
Validity of Mock Trial / Jury Research 
Actual jury proceedings would naturally be the best way to study juror 
perceptions and beliefs, but this is not achievable due to the shroud of secrecy that covers 
most jury proceedings. Juries are prohibited from disclosing or talking about matters that 
were discussed during deliberation. As such, researchers have used mock trials and juries 
in their work. Bornstein (1999) explained one significant criticism of this practice, 
namely the difficulty of creating a realistic simulation for the mock jury to consider. This 
criticism has come both from outside criminal justice academia as well as from within. 
Those who have dedicated years of study to the real processes of the justice system are all 
the more aware of the problems associated with replicating it in a laboratory setting 
(Bornstein, 1999). A significant quantity of mock trial research has been done with 
samples composed of undergraduates and college students, which while passable, was not 
a true representation of the larger public. The format that the research took (e.g., actual 
staffed trial simulation vs. written summaries) could also impact the validity of 
conclusions drawn from the research. Ideally, full trial simulations would be the method 
to employ for researchers, but they are also far more difficult to organize and cost much 
more in terms of manpower and money. A written trial summary or vignette is much 
easier to dispense, but will by nature exclude the human element of evidence 
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presentation, trial discourse such as legal arguments and witness testimony, and jury 
deliberation; all three topics are important components of real criminal proceedings 
(Bornstein, 1999). 
Bornstein (1999) analyzed 20 years’ worth of mock trial / jury research to 
determine whether simulation quality had improved over time. He found 113 total studies 
involving mock trial / jury research from 1977 to 1996. Interestingly, Bornstein (1999) 
found no evidence of quality improvement over time. Of the 113 studies, 65% had 
undergraduate students play the role of jurors, and 55% used written trial documents. In 
spite of video equipment becoming more accessible, Bornstein (1999) found no 
significant increase in the usage of video-based mock trial simulations. If anything, 
Bornstein (1999) contended that mock trial research was “becoming less realistic over 
time” (p. 13). In the face of this, he nonetheless argued that disconnect from reality may 
not matter much. Bornstein (1999) admitted several limitations to mock jury research, 
chief among them the contemptuous view of some courts if research methods did not 
closely mirror reality. To counteract this initial skepticism, Bornstein (1999) suggested 
that researchers seeking to understand jury beliefs first use more academic simulations, 
using the conclusions to improve and re-adjust the measurements for real-world jury 
study. Even then, this is no guarantee that the courts would interpret researcher 
conclusions favorably. 
Breau and Brook (2007) also investigated the validity of mock jury research. The 
newer data set, in comparison to Bornstein (1999), was already an aid to validity, though 
it was certainly not optimal. To study this topic, Breau and Brook (2007) performed 
fieldwork involving multiple mock juries. Breau and Brook (2007) were ultimately 
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attempting to discover the degree to which realism impacted mock juror experience (i.e., 
if they believed the proceedings to be real, there would be more deliberation) They set up 
four mock trials at Duke University’s law school in 2004, all of which had the premise of 
a law student having broken the school’s honor code (Breau & Brook, 2007).  
In the first two cases, the students were instructed and believed that the 
proceeding was real and the honor code violation was legitimate. In the other two, the 
students were told that they were participants in a mock jury experiment (Breau & Brook, 
2007). To aid in the illusion of realism, in the two ‘real’ trials, the law student accused of 
violating the honor code was present in the courtroom as the ‘defendant’. In the two 
overtly mock trials, the individual was not present. The four trials did not run 
simultaneously, instead running in separate pairs (i.e., both ‘real’ trials, then both mock 
trials) at points during the semester. Conclusions from the first ‘real’ and mock trials 
were used to improve the quality of the second pair. Before being allowed to deliberate, 
juries in the two ‘real’ trials were informed that their decision would be binding and 
permanent on the ‘defendant’ student. In contrast, for the overtly mock trials, jurors were 
instructed that they were participants in a trial simulation measuring the usefulness of the 
school’s honor code and the appropriateness of present sanctions. In all four cases, jurors 
had reason to take the proceedings with some measure of seriousness, though this effect 
was certainly more pronounced for the two ‘real’ trials (Breau & Brook, 2007). 
Breau and Brook (2007) saw a demonstrable impact of realism on jury 
deliberation time and verdict. The two ‘real’ juries deliberated for 40 and 90 minutes 
respectively, while both mock juries deliberated for only 30 and 25 minutes respectively. 
Sanctions were also largely different between ‘real’ and mock juries. In the first ‘real’ 
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case, the jury believed that the proceedings were biased against the ‘defendant’ and 
refused to impose any sanctions (Breau & Brook, 2007). This stood in sharp contrast to 
the guilty verdict of the first mock trial, where jurors quickly determined both guilt and 
appropriate sanctions. For the second ‘real’ case, the deliberations lasted so long that 
researchers had to cut them off, resulting in a hung jury. In the second mock trial, the 
jurors once again quickly reached a verdict and devised appropriate sanctions. A post-
proceedings questionnaire was administered to all four groups, and the two ‘real’ juries 
were informed of the nature of the experiment (Breau & Brook, 2007). When asked 
whether they believed they had put critical, genuine thought into the proceedings, both 
‘real’ juries indicated agreement and both mock juries indicated disagreement. In both 
rounds of trials, the information presented to ‘real’ and mock juries was identical, 
eliminating procedural difference as a potential source of error. It was transparently and 
logically obvious that realism had a potent effect on juror decision-making and 
deliberation (Breau & Brook, 2007). A possible future research idea that Breau and 
Brook (2007) theorized was that, in response to real crimes, a mock jury be drawn in 
parallel to the real jury, who would witness the same trial and be instructed identically to 
the real jury, except for informing the mock jurors of their role as participants in mock 
trial research. Unfortunately, Breau and Brook (2007) viewed it as very unlikely that 
many judges would permit their courtrooms to become places for research experiments. 
In conclusion, the issue of jury secrecy makes real-world study difficult, but it may be 
worthwhile for researchers to create an illusion of realism to increase the validity of their 
conclusions, given the impact of realism found by Breau and Brook (2007). However, to 
create realism, researchers will run into the ethical problems of accusing individuals of 
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crimes for academic study and deceiving participants into believing they are making 
rulings that could affect the freedom or rights of another. 
In order to avoid these moral issues, this study utilized trial vignettes. A staffed 
simulation would have been preferable but was deemed unfeasible due to the 
intrusiveness on selected classes and the monetary cost. For future study, particularly 
non-student samples, a mock trial would be preferable. It was accepted that the trial 
vignette lacked the illusion of reality and deliberations. However, layperson opinion of 
the polygraph is grossly understudied relative to most other topics in the justice system, 
and as such, any contribution the field is worthwhile. In order to measure these 
perceptions, a survey was created that measured a wide range of variables all related to 
the central question: what do jurors believe regarding the polygraph? It is possible that 
conclusions drawn here could influence policy on polygraph inclusion in some 
jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
The ultimate goal of this research was to determine the attitudes held by Boise 
State students on the use of polygraphs in the criminal justice system. Measuring attitudes 
inevitably ran into concerns about validity and reliability. It was important to ensure that 
the measures being utilized both cover the topic being surveyed and that the questions 
were understood in mostly the same way across respondents. Since the aim of this 
research was to measure perceptions on the use and accuracy of the polygraph, the 
measurement choice seemed rather simple: a survey. However, in order for this survey 
(and any surveys, by extension) to have had any degree of validity or reliability, caution 
had to be taken to ensure that the questions were operationalized properly. 
This study was conducted to examine the comparative weight lent to polygraph 
evidence (relative to DNA, eyewitness accounts, and other forms of criminal evidence) 
by potential jurors. Methodologically, it was a modified replication of the study by Myers 
et al. (2006), which analyzed the same broader question. This is an important topic to 
research, especially given the present state of available research on polygraph 
perceptions. 
For the purposes of this study, a quantitative survey was administered to students 
of Boise State University, which aimed to discover the opinions and beliefs of students 
regarding the polygraph, its accuracy, and its usage in the justice system. In forecasting 
responses, it was imperative to understand that students’ attitudes could be shaped by two 
potential sources of error: tradition and authority (Milgram & Zimbardo, 2013). Those 
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who have no experience or in-depth knowledge of the legal system could have incorrect 
or incomplete information or assumptions regarding polygraph accuracy or police usage 
of the technology. Similarly, if a respondent had taken a polygraph, they would have 
likely spoken to the examiner, who likely would not have given them a comprehensive 
summary of present literature on the polygraph due to the impracticality of condensing so 
much information into a conversation. Human reactions and ‘reading’ physical cues are 
not a well-known science among the masses, especially when it comes to interpreting 
responses (O’Toole & Bowman, 2012). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
To reiterate, the central research question to be answered was: what are the 
general attitudes of potential jurors towards polygraph evidence? There were several 
hypotheses to be tested in this study: 
H1: Potential jurors will have only moderate faith in the polygraph, ranking it 
somewhere in the middle when other types of evidence are presented. 
H2: Potential jurors who are in criminal justice courses are likely to view the 
polygraph more skeptically than those who are in non-criminal justice courses. 
H3: Potential jurors who receive a brief synopsis (less than one page) of the 
polygraph literature in addition to the vignette / questionnaire will view the polygraph 
more skeptically than those who do not receive this pre-test information. 
In summary, the expected outcomes were very similar to those of Myers et al. 
(2006), that is, there is no reason to believe that the polygraph ‘usurps the role of the 
jury’ as some justice professionals fear. 
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Conceptual Definitions 
To answer the research question clearly and test the hypotheses with clarity, 
accurate and current conceptual definitions were provided to respondents. There is not an 
official government definition for polygraph, but using a reputable dictionary definition 
seemed an appropriate alternative. While this may seem to some to be unnecessary, it was 
important that those who participated in this study did not immediately jump to the 
assumption that the polygraph instrument is a lie detector, as this would have been a 
threat to validity. The Oxford Dictionary does not explicitly equate ‘polygraph’ to ‘lie 
detector’. Identifying the importance of both instrument and examiner for survey 
respondents was important. 
Distinguishing types of evidence was also important, since respondents to the 
survey were asked to rank them in order of strength and credence. It was important to 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. The Duhaime Legal Dictionary 
defined direct evidence as follows: “evidence tendered at trial in the form of recounting 
of personal observations, or a document which directly establishes a fact sought to be 
proven” (Duhaime, 2017, n.p.). Because polygraphs are never administered in real-time 
(as the crime is occurring), they always fall under the category of circumstantial 
evidence, which the Duhaime Legal Dictionary defined as “evidence which may allow a 
trial judge or jury to deduce or logically infer a certain fact from other established facts, 
which have been proven” (Duhaime, 2017, n.p.). 
Myers et al. (2006) used four other types of evidence as comparison points for 
polygraphs: fingerprint evidence, DNA-based evidence, eyewitness evidence, and 
handwriting analysis. The definitions for each of these were fairly self-evident, though 
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this study distinguished them specifically for the benefit of respondents. Fingerprint 
evidence, for the purposes of this research, included any police-gathered and analyzed 
materials which required a professional fingerprint examiner (Myers et al., 2006). 
Similarly, DNA evidence included all forms of blood work and body fluid analysis. 
Eyewitness evidence involved all forms of individual testimony (either the victim or 
bystanders, excluding the distinct concept of expert witnesses). Handwriting analysis was 
considered police investigation and subjective analysis of handwriting where applicable 
(Myers et al., 2006). 
Study Design, Sampling Procedure, and Data Collection 
The sample in this study consisted of nine total classes; five of which were 
criminal justice courses. The sampling method used was a stratified cluster sample. For 
the non-CJ courses, one course was drawn from each of the ‘levels’ in the undergraduate 
catalog (i.e., 100-level, 200-level, 300-level, 400-level). For the CJ courses, three did not 
require upper-division standing while the other two did require it. This was similarly 
intended to ensure that the sample was representative of the wider student body. The non-
CJ courses were drawn from the university’s Student Center class search function. 
Beginning alphabetically, every class subject was numbered sequentially from 1 to 122. 
A random number generator randomly selected one of these course subjects. After the 
four course subjects were chosen, the search function was used to identify all available 
class sections under a particular subject by searching for any available course numbered 
from 100 to 499. After identifying the total number of available courses, these were 
numbered sequentially, with the lowest course number being labelled as 1. A random 
number generator then selected a particular class section. For example, if the random 
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number generator had produced 1 when selecting subjects, it would have chosen the 
course subject titled Academic. There were a total of 12 class selections under this prefix 
with course numbers from 100 to 499. These 12 classes would have been numbered, and 
the random number generator would have chosen one of them.  
Upon selection of a specific course (e.g., MATH, 400-level, non-CJ), the 
following selections could not be in that same category; that is, another selected class was 
then prohibited from being 400-level, and if the random number generator happened to 
select another class in this category, the generator was used again (and as many times as 
necessary) until it selected a course in line with all the criteria. To select the criminal 
justice courses, the CJ discipline was chosen in the Student Center and all available 
courses were numbered accordingly. The random number generator was used to select 
five classes, two of which were upper division-required, and three were not. Classes were 
excluded if they were held online or were single-day workshops. The exclusions were 
due to the impracticality of meeting and speaking to the class in-person, an important 
component of the methodology. An online course was initially chosen in the sample, but 
upon discovery that it was held online, another course was selected to take its place. The 
chosen classes were all face-to-face and lecture-based. Drawing classes from each level 
helped to ensure that the sample included individuals from multiple levels of 
undergraduate work. 
Once the total sample of courses was drawn, an email was sent to each of the 
professors teaching the respective class. The non-CJ courses were: PHIL 103 
(Introduction to Philosophy: Moral Problems), SOCWRK 201 (Foundations of Social 
Work), BASQ-STD 380 (Colloquium in Basque Studies), and HEP 440 (Health 
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Promotion Programming). The CJ courses were: CJ 101 (Introduction to Criminal 
Justice), CJ 102 (Introduction to Police), CJ 103 (Introduction to Law and Justice), CJ 
375 (Criminal Procedure), and CJ 426 (Statistics). This email contained a brief 
introduction of the researcher and the project, an attachment with the text of the informed 
consent document and the survey, and concluded with a request to attend a class to 
explain the project in greater detail and allow for any questions to be addressed in-person. 
The professors were free to decline, as a few did, and if they did, the sampling framework 
explained above was used to select a replacement course. After obtaining professor 
approval, the researcher attended the previously-agreed class time and took three to five 
minutes explaining the study, its purpose and importance, and answering any questions 
from students. The link was also provided to the professors at this time, and they were 
asked to send the link out through Blackboard or via class-wide email. This prevented 
students from having to manually copy down and rewrite the rather long URL to access 
the survey. It was emphasized in every class that the survey was strictly voluntary and 
that the professor’s provision of the link was not to be taken as any sort of requirement to 
participate. To further ensure the survey was taken voluntarily, no extra credit or 
incentive was introduced in any course. It was certainly true that an incentive could have 
resulted in higher response rates, but the difficulty of working out an acceptable 
alternative for each class for non-participants was deemed to outweigh the benefits of 
incentives. 
The Qualtrics survey opened on October 9, 2017 and was available until 
November 3, 2017. The relatively lengthy amount of time allowed students to take the 
survey at their convenience and that those who did respond had enough time to give each 
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question appropriate thought, thus increasing validity. Furthermore, leaving the survey as 
purely optional also avoids any issue of coercion or socially-influenced responses. The 
survey took approximately 10 – 15 minutes to complete and was 17 questions in length. 
First, it included a page explaining informed consent in detail, which provided the 
respondent with references to counseling services if necessary and contact information 
for the researcher if they had any further questions before or after completing the survey 
(Appendix A). The first page also explained precisely that users could exit the survey at 
any time if it caused them distress, and that should they do this, no penalty would be 
incurred. Clicking the ‘next’ arrow from this first page was an indication of informed 
consent and brought respondents to the page of relevant definitions (Appendix B). The 
trial vignette followed the page of definitions (Appendix C). After proceeding through 
the vignette, half of all respondents were then provided an additional narrative summary 
of polygraph literature for their reference to be used in the last question of the survey. 
Respondents who received the additional information were expressly notified of their 
selection. For the respondents who were not selected to receive this additional 
information, the survey clearly stated that they had not been selected by a page which 
stated, “You were not randomly selected to receive an additional literature summary”. 
After the two groups were determined, the 16 main survey questions were administered. 
Question 17 pertained to the additional information, and, for this, the selected 
respondents answered on a continuum. Question 17 was also present in non-selected 
group surveys, but respondents here used the answer option that indicated they had not 
received the information. There was only one version of the survey and both groups of 
respondents received the same documentation. After completing the survey questions, an 
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option was provided for respondents to offer their comments or criticism of the project 
and its implementation. This allows for further improvement of the survey should it be 
administered again in the future. 
This form of questionnaire was chosen over interviews and observations for 
several reasons. Involving real jurors was not feasible given that all known jurisdictions 
keep jury deliberations strictly secret, and in certain cases, jurors may be prohibited from 
discussing the case even after a verdict has been reached. The unpredictable length of 
jury deliberations would be an issue if real cases were to be used. Inclusion of real, 
ongoing cases would place the researcher in a dangerous place of potentially serving as 
an impetus for different behavior if the jurors knew that their behavior and decisions were 
being used in an academic study. Interviews also posed a risk of allowing the 
introduction of personal biases and opinions from the interviewer that are not pertinent or 
helpful in an academic sense. Furthermore, the logistics and resources present for the 
researcher made conducting interviews or random samples of a larger community 
impractical. 
Dependent Variables 
There were multiple dependent variables in this survey. Due to the unavailability 
of Myers’ et al. (2006) methodology, the measurement questions for each were 
approximated based on their description in the original study. Guilt of the offender was 
the first dependent variable (see Appendix B, question 1). It was dichotomous, reflective 
of the range of decisions allowed to U.S. juries. Confidence in the verdict was a second 
dependent variable and was measured at the ratio level as a percentage (Appendix B, 
question 2). This allowed respondents to more precisely enumerate the level of 
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confidence they had in their overall decision. Overall juror confidence in polygraphs was 
another dependent variable and was measured at the ordinal level by three different 
questions (Appendix B, questions 3, 7, and 8). Questions 5 and 9 asked respondents to 
grade their confidence on a five-point scale. The five answers were “not influenced at 
all”, “slightly influenced”, “moderately influenced”, “greatly influenced”, and “extremely 
influenced” (Myers et al., 2006, p. 9). Question 9 asked respondents to grade confidence 
in polygraphs relative to the four other types of comparison evidence listed by Myers et 
al. (2006). Respondents answered whether polygraph evidence should be considered 
more or less trustworthy in relation to the other types. All four types of comparison 
evidence (i.e., fingerprint, DNA, eyewitness, and handwriting) were separate, which 
allowed respondents to grade polygraphs relative to that individual type of evidence. 
Support for expert testimony on polygraphs was the penultimate dependent variable and 
was measured at the nominal level (Appendix B, questions 5 and 6). Question five 
focused on the use of expert testimony in a positive manner; that is, allowing polygraph 
experts to testify in court that an individual was being truthful when they denied guilt on 
the polygraph. Question six, in contrast, analyzed the use of expert testimony in a 
negative manner; that is, allowing a polygraph expert to testify in court that an accused 
individual was being deceptive when they denied guilt. To explore H3, question four 
asked respondents to grade their own ability to informally detect lies (i.e., through 
conversation) on a percentage scale from 0 to 100%. 
Independent Variables 
Due to concerns over anonymity, race was excluded from the list of demographic 
factors analyzed in the study. The concerns stemmed from the large disparity in minority 
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enrollment at the university. Per the enrollment data from Fall 2016 (the latest time for 
which data is available), Whites accounted for almost 75% of all enrolled students. With 
such a large disparity, it would theoretically be possible to link a particular response to a 
student, which was not intended. As such, race was excluded from the analysis.  
There were two independent variables in this study. Enrollment in a criminal 
justice class was measured at the nominal level by question 12, which asked respondents 
to indicate yes or no as to whether the class is listed under the CJ prefix by the Student 
Center site (Appendix B). Enrollment in a criminal justice course was also selected as an 
independent variable to gauge whether it led to more critical attitudes towards the 
polygraph, to test H2. Receipt of the additional summary and its influence were measured 
at the ordinal level by question 16, which asked respondents whether they had received 
the document, and if so, the extent to which it had impacted their decision. For 
respondents who did not receive the document, an option was provided on this question 
to indicate that they had not received it 
Four control variables were present in the survey: age, sex, class level, and 
personal / familial involvement in the criminal justice system. Age was measured at the 
ratio level (Appendix B, question 9). Sex was measured at the nominal level (Appendix 
B, question 10). Class level was measured at the ordinal level on a four-point scale, with 
the acceptable answers being 100-level, 200-level, 300-level, and 400-level (Appendix B, 
question 11). Personal / familial employment in a criminal justice agency was measured 
at the nominal level, and respondents answered yes or no (Appendix B, question 13). 
Personal or familial involvement in polygraph or criminal justice work was also selected 
as a possible control for more supportive attitudes toward the polygraph. Age and sex are 
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frequent control variables in research, though Myers’ et al (2006) analysis did not include 
them in their discussion. Class level was chosen as a control variable, and was measured 
at the ordinal level by question 12 (Appendix B).  
Validity and Reliability 
When dealing with perceptions and opinions, there is always going to be a degree 
of difficulty in attaining valid, reliable results. This was one reason that this study was 
partly replicative in nature, and even the baseline study, by Myers et al. (2006), used 
measures that had been used before their research was conducted. They indicated that 
similar questions had been used by larger agencies, such as Gallup, in a much earlier 
(1984) poll to measure attitudes. Each question on the instrument had a reasonable level 
of face validity. The survey asked individuals to descriptively rate where polygraph 
evidence stands, which made logical sense in that it would lead to answers which are tied 
to that question. Furthermore, the provision of relevant definitions and allotment of time 
before test administration to inform all respondents helped to ensure that they had a solid 
understanding of what was expected and what their answers signified. The likelihood of 
poorly-written or unclear questions would have been higher if this study had used newly-
invented measures. Myers et al. (2006) indicated that their questions had been drawn 
from previous opinion surveys administered to experts by Amato (1993), Gallup 
Organization (1984), and Iacono and Lykken (1997). In that particular study, Iacono and 
Lykken (1997) did not report any substantial criticism of the validity and reliability of 
their questions, though it was conceded that their questions were administered to experts 
rather than students as was the case in this study. 
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In addition, while no questions were direct repeats of one another, several were 
directly related: such as the questions which asked how much the polygraph evidence 
weighed on the decision inside the sentence decision and then outside of a criminal 
proceeding. Asking these triangulation questions gained a depth of information and 
helped ensure that respondents’ understanding of the questions was correct (Tokunaga, 
2016). 
The choice of questionnaires / surveys was deliberate, as they are the most 
common form of formal public opinion research, though they are being challenged by 
social media data analysis (Assessing New Ways, 2016). Businesses, such as Gallup, are 
very well-known for conducting public opinion surveys, and they have been referenced in 
academic publications such as Myers et al. (2006). Not only would interviews have 
required additional resources that were not presently available, aggregating hundreds of 
transcribed interviews into legible, interpretable data would have been significantly more 
time-consuming. Numerical scales also decrease the likelihood of personal bias affecting 
validity than would researcher interpretation of interview code words (Tokunaga, 2016). 
In addition to this, the choice of anonymously-administered online surveys was 
advantageous given that some opinions on polygraph may be considered controversial, 
and individuals would likely hesitate to express these opinions even in the presence of an 
academic interview. An anonymous survey allowed these potentially-contentious 
opinions to surface in comparative safety, avoiding the problem of social desirability bias 
(Tokunaga, 2016). In line with the standards suggested by the American Association for 
Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), to increase validity, the questions were replicated 
from previous research as much as possible. The provision of definitions and clear 
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delineation of acceptable answers increased internal validity in the survey as well 
(AAPOR, 2015). 
Limitations 
As with any research, there were limitations that have to be conceded. The first 
issue with a project such as this was the difficulty / propriety of condensing the depth of 
information that emerges in a criminal trial down to a readable, quickly-understandable 
vignette. It was a valid criticism to argue that it was impossible to condense so much 
information without losing valuable depth and context. A particular problem was 
avoiding ‘prejudicing’ respondents towards positive or negative responses based on the 
vignette and especially those who received the review of polygraph literature. Precautions 
were taken to ensure that no bias could be observed in the summary of literature. Four 
positive court cases / articles in favor of the polygraph were included, as well as four 
court cases / articles that were critical of the polygraph. Equal space was allotted to both 
categories. 
The research design itself also imposed its own limitations. Because the survey 
was a single case study of students, it was impossible to say with certainty that the 
patterns observed would remain true from year to year. Furthermore, because the test was 
administered only once in the fall semester, it was impossible to account for the potential 
change in opinion that could occur as classes proceeded and professors engaged in 
discussion with their classes. Because of this, the research cannot account for the impact 
of ongoing education on opinions about the polygraph. The results of this survey could 
only be considered a ‘snapshot’ of the opinion of the sample at the time (Tokunaga, 
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2016). Because there were no pre- or post-tests, this precluded any examination of causal 
relationship between suspected factors (Anderson, 2017). 
Second, while questionnaires had a rapid turnaround time when compared to 
interviews or direct observation, it was possible that even with the goal of keeping 
documentation brief that survey fatigue occurred, especially so for those who received 
the additional summary (Tokunaga, 2016). Questionnaires of this sort also did not allow 
the researcher to clarify misunderstandings or directions after the test had begun, and 
with the amount of information that was presented in a condensed vignette and optional 
summary, there was also undeniably a risk of some respondents being unclear or unsure 
of their answers (Tokunaga, 2016). This made it all the more important to allow sufficient 
time beforehand to explain in full detail the study’s purpose, scope, and future usage of 
its data. However, with the degree of preparation and rigor that was applied to this study, 
the risk of confusion seems manageable. 
As with any student-based sample, conclusions drawn from this data cannot 
generalize perfectly towards the larger public, since there were demographic differences 
between the two. College students, on the whole, are younger and tend to be at least 
slightly more liberal than does the general public (Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998). 
Druckman and Kam (2009) addressed the concerns that other researchers may have with 
student samples. External validity is compromised in a student sample if the research is 
attempting to identify causal relationship between variables, which this study was not 
intending to do. In a larger, more comprehensive study, it would be useful to have a 
separate sample drawn from the public to compare to the findings from the student 
sample. 
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It was also possible that the classes selected by the random number generator had 
widely different numbers of students enrolled, which could have greatly skewed the 
statistical analyses of a particular category. This was the case with the 100-level courses, 
as they had many more students than the 400-level classes. The possibility of this 
occurring was also a threat to validity, as it would have been statistically invalid to 
attempt to draw conclusions if the sample size for one category of class was only 30 
compared to another category’s 200. Any discrepancies by sex or age, compared to the 
proportions of Boise State’s student population as a whole (per the Fall 2016 Census 
Enrollment) were noted in the data analysis section. The choice to take a stratified cluster 
sample of each class level was intended as an aid to generalizability. If a stratified cluster 
sample had not been taken, it was possible that the sample could have been 
disproportionately comprised of members of one class level, which would have 
diminished its generalizability to the larger student sample. 
To determine whether the hypotheses were supported, chi-square analyses were 
conducted. Because most of the variables were nominal or ordinal, this prevented 
stronger statistical analyses from being performed. Even descriptive statistics were 
limited by ordinal data, as the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation do 
not produce meaningful results with ordinal variables. As such, chi-squares were the best 
available measure to determine whether relationships existed between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Sample Descriptives 
Despite attempting to obtain a large, broadly representative sample with the 
methods chosen, it was evident that this was unfulfilled. The only control variable in 
agreement with previous enrollment data was that of age, with a median value of 21 
years. Aside from this, choosing multiple levels of courses clearly did not serve its 
intended purpose. With over 70% of all responses coming from 100-level students, it was 
difficult to suggest with much confidence that this was representative of the attitudes of 
any other class-level (Table 1.0). However, with age also being similarly concentrated at 
the lower end, this was less surprising of a result. The mean was skewed upwards due to 
the presence of several older respondents (above 60 years old). Also somewhat 
expectedly, more responses were from CJ students than from non-CJ students. This made 
some sense, as students in CJ courses were more likely to have their professors encourage 
them to participate or to feel it was worthwhile to answer such surveys, since it was 
related to what they are studying. However, because the groups were not equal, 
conclusions were less generalizable outside the criminal justice discipline. 
Because the course was forwarded through class emails or posted on BlackBoard, 
there was no definitive value for the number of students that could have received the link 
(i.e., not all students will check emails or Blackboard). However, based on total 
enrollment data from each class, there were roughly 346 possible recipients of the email. 
Only 113 opened the survey link at all. Out of the 113 opened survey links, there were 
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only 56 completed surveys. In terms of response rate, using the total number of opened 
survey links (113), the response rate was approximately 33%. Since 56 of these 113 total 
links were actually completed, the completion rate was roughly 50%. The combination of 
young age and low class-level made the very small sample of upper-division required 
students very much expected. Out of all respondents, only four were students in an upper 
division-required CJ course.  
Table 1.0 Sample descriptives 
Variable n Percentage Mean Median SD 
Sex      
     Male 16 28.6%    
     Female 39 69.6%    
     Missing 1 1.8%    
Course Level      
     100 Level 40 70.2%    
     200 Level 2 3.5%    
     300 Level 9 15.8%    
     400 Level 5 8.8%    
In a CJ Course      
     Yes 39 68.4%    
     No 15 26.3%    
     Missing 3 5.3%    
Upper Division CJ 
Course 
     
     Yes 5 8.8%    
     No 29 50.9%    
     Not Applicable 23 40.4%    
Employed in CJS      
     Yes 4 7.0%    
     No 50 87.7%    
     Unsure 1 1.8%    
Age 56  25.89 21 12.68 
Verdict      
     Guilty 20 35.1%    
     Not Guilty 37 64.9%    
% confidence in verdict 57  57.92% 51% 21.76 
Believed % accuracy of 
polygraph 
57  54.80% 51% 20.84 
Personal detection 
accuracy % 
56  50.1% 50% 20.36 
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Influence of vignette      
     Not influenced 8 14.3%    
     Slightly 26 46.4%    
     Moderately 16 28.6%    
     Greatly 6 10.7%    
Support examiner 
testimony of non-
deceptive (+) exam 
     
     Yes 31 55.4%    
     No 25 44.6%    
Support examiner 
testimony of deceptive 
(-) exam 
     
     Yes 33 58.9%    
     No 23 41.1%    
General opinion of 
polygraph 
     
     Only evidence 
needed 
1 1.8%    
     Useful when 
corroborated 
24 42.9%    
     Questionable but can 
be used 
25 44.6%    
     Not useful 6 10.7%    
Polygraph v. 
fingerprints – 
trustworthiness 
     
     Polygraph more 8 14.3%    
     Polygraph less 48 85.7%    
Polygraph v. DNA – 
trustworthiness 
     
     Polygraph more 7 12.5%    
     Polygraph less 49 87.5%    
Polygraph v. 
handwriting – 
trustworthiness 
     
     Polygraph more 21 37.5%    
     Polygraph less 35 62.5%    
Polygraph v. eyewitness 
– trustworthiness 
     
     Polygraph more 15 26.8%    
     Polygraph less 41 73.2%    
Influence of extra 
literature summary 
     
     No influence 3 5.8%    
     Slightly 7 13.5%    
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     Moderately 9 17.3%    
     Greatly 2 3.8%    
     Did not receive 31 59.6%    
 
Bivariate Analyses 
Due to the ordinal level of measurement for most dependent variables, chi-square 
analyses were the best-suited statistical measure to identify relationships between 
variables. Results of the verdict were divided, as only 35.1% found the accused guilty. 
Percentage confidence in the verdict itself was relatively moderate, with a mean of 57.9% 
(Table 1.0). H1 theorized that respondents would have only moderate faith in the 
polygraph, rather than the unquestioning acceptance that previous authors have written. 
Based on the data in Tables 1.0 and 1.3, it appeared safe to say that H1 was supported. 
When compared to the other four types of evidence (fingerprint, DNA, handwriting, 
eyewitness) used in the Myers et al. (2006) study, polygraphs were seen as less 
trustworthy than all of them. Average confidence in the polygraph was also relatively low 
at 54.8%. This result was indicative that the instrument did not ‘invade the province of 
the jury’ (Pettit, 2007). Respondents also clearly showed that the provision of polygraph 
evidence within the trial vignette did not have a very strong impact on their overall 
verdict. The median value for influence of the vignette evidence was 2, which 
corresponded to ‘slightly influenced’. 
H1 was further strengthened by the surprisingly skeptical attitudes towards 
examiner clarification of results. As seen in Table 1.1 below, only 55.4% of respondents 
believed that examiners should be permitted to explain a non-deceptive result. The 
reasoning for such skeptical attitudes toward even clarification would be an interesting 
continuation of this research. Distrust in the polygraph also extended to examiner 
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testimony regarding a deceptive (i.e., a failed test) result, as seen by Table 1.2. 
Respondents did not believe that examiners should be allowed in court even to clarify 
that a suspect had failed a polygraph exam. This suggested that respondents had much 
more nuanced views of the polygraph than previous studies have shown. 
Table 1.1 Support for examiner explanation of non-deceptive results 
Response n Response Percentage 
Yes 31 55.4% 
No 25 44.6% 
 
Table 1.2 Support for examiner explanation of deceptive results 
Response n Response Percentage 
Yes 33 58.9% 
No 23 41.1% 
 
H1 was also supported by respondents’ opinions on the polygraph’s role and 
function in a courtroom. As Table 1.3 shows, only one individual believed the polygraph 
could entirely decide a case. This is the sort of opinion that, if widespread, would lend 
credence to the ‘invading the province’ thought. It was very clear from the numbers in 
this sample that such thinking was rare. With a modal value that corresponded to 
“questionable use, entitled to little support against other evidence”, support for the 
polygraph in this sample was marginal. 
Table 1.3 General opinion of the polygraph 
Opinion n Percentage 
Only evidence needed 1 1.8% 
Useful when corroborated 24 42.9% 
Questionable but can be useful 25 44.6% 
Not useful 6 10.7% 
Total 56 100% 
 
Interestingly, respondents within this sample also appeared to have a far more 
realistic idea of their personal accuracy at detecting lies in conversation. The self-
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reported accuracy mean was lower than that of the polygraph at 50.1% (Table 1.4). This 
was in line with research on interpersonal lie detection, which suggested that even trained 
and experienced individuals still did not have lie detection abilities significantly above 
that of a layperson, who themselves were not very skilled at detecting lies in 
conversation. It was intriguing to note that the averages for polygraphs and persons were 
not statistically significantly different. 
Table 1.4 Perceived accuracy of the polygraph 
Respondent Perception n Mean Median Mode SD 
Polygraph accuracy 57 54.8% 51% 50% 20.84 
Personal detection accuracy 56 50.1% 50% 50% 20.36 
 
Sample respondents did not believe they were particularly adept at detecting lies, 
but they also did not see much promise in instrumental detection either. However, with 
both personal accuracy and instrument accuracy, the standard deviation was particularly 
large compared to the mean itself, with an SD of 20.84 for the instrument and 20.36 for 
personal lie detection (Table 1.4). The large standard deviation in this instance weakened 
the ability to make definitive conclusions (i.e., it was not an argumentative or research-
interesting point to state that laypersons had anywhere between 30 to 70% confidence in 
the polygraph to detect lies). The 30 to 70% range was obtained by taking the mean and 
shifting one standard deviations’ worth of distance in both a positive and negative 
direction. 
The second hypothesis argued that criminal justice students would be more apt to 
view the polygraph in a critical light compared to those not enrolled in such courses. To 
analyze this, chi-square analyses were conducted to determine if there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the aforementioned attribute and their attitudes toward 
the polygraph. An alpha of .05 was chosen as the threshold for significance in all chi-
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square tests. None of the chi-square tests resulted in significance for respondents enrolled 
in criminal justice courses. 
Table 1.5 Chi-square analyses CJ course with dependent variables 
CJ Course Comparisons n X2 Degrees of 
freedom 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Verdict 57 .036 2 .982 
Graded verdict 57 48.387 2 .617 
Confidence in polygraph 57 50.301 56 .689 
Influence of evidence 56 1.646 6 .949 
Clarifying non-deceptive 56 .066 2 .968 
Clarifying deceptive 56 .539 2 .764 
General opinion of polygraph 56 3.671 6 .721 
Polygraph vs. fingerprint 56 5.346 2 .069 
Polygraph vs. DNA 56 4.167 2 .124 
Polygraph vs. handwriting 56 1.255 2 .534 
Polygraph vs. eyewitness 56 .576 2 .750 
 
While the small sample size weakened the predictive ability of bivariate 
correlations, they were also conducted to explore any further relationships between CJ 
course students and their attitudes toward the polygraph. Additionally, low cell counts 
were an issue for every chi-square analysis between CJ course students and their answers 
The same alpha of 0.05 was used as the standard for significance. Ultimately, the chi-
square results also were indicative of a lack of relationship between variables. The only 
variables to have any significant correlation at the .05 level with CJ course students were 
other control variables: namely, whether the course required upper division standing and 
whether the individual had any personal or familial ties to polygraph work or criminal 
justice agencies. The conclusions from these bivariate correlations also did not suggest 
any unusual relationship: it was not an argumentative point to suggest that respondents in 
CJ courses were more likely to be members of upper-division required classes (Table 
1.6). Due to the complete lack of statistically significant results H2 was not supported. 
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Table 1.6 Bivariate correlations 
 Respondent in a CJ course 
Upper division requirement in CJ 
course 
.300 
(.023) 
n=57 
Personal or familial involvement in CJ .357 
 (.007) 
 n=56 
Polygraph vs. DNA evidence -.222 
 (.100) 
 n=56 
 
The final hypothesis argued that those randomly selected to receive the one-page 
literature summary would have significantly harsher views on the polygraph than those 
who did not. Identically to H2, chi-square analyses were conducted to observe any 
significant effects that the extra information had. Unfortunately, low cell counts were 
once again present for all chi-square analyses in terms of the extra literature summary. 
One relationship was statistically significant. For those who received the extra literature 
summary, there was a significantly different influence of the polygraph evidence in the 
trial vignette, with an alpha of .002. Respondents who received the extra literature 
summary had more critical views of the polygraph than those who did not receive it. This 
suggested that the additional information was actually read by the respondents. It was 
notable that the influence of this additional information was negative, even though equal 
space and sources were provided for both supportive and critical literature. 
Problematically, low cell count was an extreme issue here, as 90% of cells for this 
question had an expected count less than five. Conceptually, this made some sense, as it 
was likely that having new information (both positive and negative) regarding the 
polygraph could have changed its swaying power compared to those who did not have the 
information. Bivariate correlation using Pearson’s R was also conducted, though it was 
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further weakened by the extremely small sample size for this question: only 21 out of the 
total sample of 57 received the extra document. For the bivariate analysis, an alpha of .05 
was used. In this analysis, none of the bivariate comparisons reached significance. 
Because only one chi-square relationship was found to be significant between receipt of 
the literature summary and attitudes towards the polygraph, it appeared that H3 was only 
partially supported. The literature summary did not significantly impact any other 
relevant responses. 
Table 1.7 Chi-square analyses literature summary with dependent variables 
Literature Summary 
Comparisons 
n X2 Degrees of 
freedom 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Verdict 52 3.252 4 .517 
Graded verdict 52 80.768 100 .921 
Confidence in polygraph 52 120.810 104 .124 
Influence of evidence 52 31.332 12 .002 
Clarifying non-deceptive 52 4.797 4 .309 
Clarifying deceptive 52 1.527 4 .822 
General opinion of polygraph 52 10.526 12 .570 
Polygraph vs. fingerprint 52 6.033 4 .197 
Polygraph vs. DNA 52 4.449 4 .349 
Polygraph vs. handwriting 52 3.931 4 .415 
Polygraph vs. eyewitness 52 1.906 4 .753 
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Table 1.8 Bivariate correlations for literature summary 
 Literature Summary 
Age -.213 
(.130) 
n=52 
Sex .113 
 (.426) 
 n=52 
Course Level -.056 
 (.694) 
 n=52 
Upper Division CJ course .099 
 (.486) 
 n=52 
Personal / familial involvement in CJ .113 
             .424 
 n=52 
 
Discussion 
In terms of policy implications, this study’s impact was limited, as the sample was 
composed of college students and therefore was not guaranteed to have been 
representative of actual public opinion. However, there were several conclusions that 
could be drawn despite these issues. It was evident that there was little reason for the 
courts to believe that the polygraph ‘invades the province of the jury’ (Pettit, 2007, p. 
10). With less than half of the total sample having chosen to convict the offender and 
average confidence in the polygraph at approximately 54%, it was clear that sample 
respondents were not blankly accepting polygraph results as proof of guilt. Respondents 
were also divided on whether polygraph examiners should be permitted in court to 
explain the meaning of certain results, which was unexpected. Potential jurors within this 
sample absolutely did not display deference or confidence levels that would have 
suggested they allow the polygraph to ‘invade the province’, but neither did they 
completely reject it (Pettit, 2007, p. 10). Similar to the conclusions from Myers et al. 
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(2006), average opinion of the utility of the instrument was moderately supportive. 
Potential jurors saw some use for the polygraph, but most indicated that results needed to 
be corroborated by other evidence. This suggested that the jury was still fulfilling its role 
as ‘trier of fact’ in the justice system when it came to polygraph evidence. Courts which 
exclude the instrument out of concern for jury integrity should reconsider whether such 
beliefs are substantiated by current data, as this study and Myers et al. (2006) indicated 
that there was very little reason for such consternation. However, it was conceded that 
court exclusion on the basis of a Daubert failure could not be challenged by the results of 
this study, since the study focused on potential juror perceptions, as opposed to polygraph 
science itself. 
H2 inquired whether respondents in criminal justice courses viewed the polygraph 
more skeptically than those not in such courses. Chi-square analyses of questions 13 
(whether the respondent took the survey in a CJ course), 1 (verdict), 6 and 7 (support for 
examiner clarification of results) consistently demonstrated statistical non-significance. 
Unfortunately, due to the extremely small sample size, it was difficult to say that these 
results were very representative of any wider population, even just the student body. 
Nonetheless, H2 must be rejected, as none of the available statistical measures supported 
it. It is possible that, in a larger sample or one that includes criminal justice professionals 
as well as non-CJ workers, a similar hypothesis could be supported. Judges and lawyers 
who know the precedent and history of the polygraph would be unlikely to support it, 
where those with a less informed view might be more prone to believe in the polygraph. 
Enrollment and participation in a CJ course did not have a statistically significant impact 
on whether attitudes regarding whether or not examiners should be allowed to explain 
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what the results truly mean. Given that the majority of the sample viewed this practice 
negatively, it was not surprising that this is the case. 
H3 supposed that individuals who were randomly selected to receive the extra 
vignette of polygraph literature (with equal inclusion of supportive and critical 
information) would view the polygraph more skeptically than those who did not receive 
it. Chi-square analysis were performed with this question (question 16) and the questions 
from H2 (verdict and support for examiner clarification), and once again, none of the 
results were statistically significant. This result was particularly limited by an even 
smaller sample size, as only 21 respondents received and responded to this final question. 
With such a miniscule sample, the author was precluded from any larger generalization 
outside the sample. None of the demographic control variables were found to be 
statistically significant on the impact of this vignette, which was expected. It was 
probable that respondents to this survey already had a fairly balanced view of polygraphs, 
regardless of the information provided. This was a positive conclusion for the sample, but 
was not supportive of the research questions. 
It was possible that the CSI effect was occurring in this study. Because 
polygraphs are not ‘traditional’ forensic evidence (e.g., blood spatter, gunshot residue, 
DNA analysis), jurors may have been less likely to consider its importance in a case 
when presented with multiple types of evidence. The lack of a federal rule for polygraphs 
and the resulting different standards among the states also meant that results and policy 
implications from this study could not be generalized outside of Idaho. Expanded 
replication (i.e., taking a truly public sample) in other jurisdictions would rectify this lack 
of information. Further scientific analysis of polygraph theory and technique is also 
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needed in order for expanded use, as it would have a strong impact on the instrument’s 
ability to pass Daubert, which determines whether it is allowed in the courtroom at all. 
The shaky legal precedent for polygraphs is set in stone, but it would also be important 
for courts and judges challenge case history if later studies shine a more supportive light 
on the instrument. 
It will be similarly vital for police departments and other state agencies to 
understand that even course instruction on informal / conversational lie detection does not 
grant them any sort of sixth sense or make them significantly better than the larger public. 
This could influence the hiring and teaching practices of these same agencies when it 
comes to lie detection. Decisions made here could impact the justice system in other 
areas as well. For example, changes in investigative practices or interrogation methods 
could easily influence a case as it proceeds through the justice system. It will be 
imperative for organizations to make decisions that are supported by up-to-date research 
and appropriate methods. Educating the public on the bleak reality of conversational lie 
detection would be valuable as well, as it is possible (though not guaranteed) that jurors 
may engage in their own form of lie detection in a trial proceeding, such as watching a 
defendant during their testimony. However, it must be conceded that whether jurors 
actually engage in this behavior was outside the scope of this study. 
Different methods of lie detection exist, and it is important for them to be studied 
and related to the polygraph. Converus is one of these companies, and they have 
conducted lie detection using instrumentation that tracks eye movements. Proponents of 
Converus have indicated that it can have a very high (approximately 86%) accuracy rate, 
and that proper techniques of the instrument could be easily taught to new users (Handler, 
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2016). The one major drawback at this time would be the rather steep cost of each exam; 
Converus’ EyeDetect machines cost approximately $4,000 each. Because the criminal 
process already is rather time-consuming and expensive, it is unlikely that Converus will 
see widespread implementation any time soon. Regardless, the potential corroborative 
value of alternative methods of lie detection is very high and will remain a worthy 
research topic as it continues to be explored (Handler, 2016). 
Suggestions for Future Research 
For future research, validity could be improved by making the trial and jury 
proceedings into a full simulation, rather than distilling the facts into a short vignette. It is 
true that such methodological changes are more personnel-intensive and expensive, but 
they provide a level of similarity to real experience that is much closer than written 
summaries and surveys can achieve. Courts would be more likely to accept findings from 
studies in which respondents’ experiences were close to reality. These validity gains 
should be weighed against the potential for ethical problems in approximating real trials. 
It is likely that future research conducted in this manner would have to avoid simulating 
the most serious of crimes, such as murder and rape, due to the obvious ethical issues of 
accusing an individual of egregious crimes and deliberately leading participants to think 
that they are ruling on real crimes all for the sake of research. If a vignette-based study 
were to be used, it would be imperative that the language and reading level be tailored 
appropriately. Surveys that included with graduate students could use more technical 
terms than could be used in a study targeting freshmen. 
Improvements could also be made by obtaining and referring to the most current 
policies on polygraph administration and evidence when designing a future study. It 
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would be of little worth for participants to work with obsolete or unused practices. As 
such, relevant-irrelevant tests should not be utilized in any future studies that analyze 
perceptions or opinions, since the National Research Council (2003) indicated that 
relevant-irrelevant polygraphs were viewed skeptically even among the polygraph 
community itself. While it would not likely be feasible to administer a mock test to 
educate all potential jurors on techniques and theory, it would be important to ensure that 
studies utilize methods that are permitted in judicial settings. Similarly, definitions must 
be updated and changed when necessary to ensure that they are as close to reality and 
practice as possible. For studies that include college students as part of the sample, it 
would be advantageous to look at an additional sample drawn from the public. This 
would allow for comparison and highlight any differences between the two groups 
beyond what is already known (i.e., that college students are younger and are more 
liberal). It would be imperative that student samples were drawn from multiple 
departments and disciplines within a university, as this would aid in generalizability 
towards the entire student body. 
To expand the depth of information in a future study, qualitative interviews with 
respondents and polygraph professionals would be a strong suggestion. The addition of a 
post-closure class visit to the methodology of this study would be one way of increasing 
available information. Researchers could go to the same classes as before and ask the 
respondents if they had any further questions pertaining to the survey. This does not 
guarantee that respondents would provide any further information, but the opportunity to 
do so would be present, as well as allowing any misunderstandings or vagueness to be 
clarified immediately. In the current study, no respondent used the provided email to 
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contact the researcher, so it was possible that the survey did not have any such issues. 
Again, this would likely increase the cost of the study, but as Breau and Brook (2007) 
and Bornstein (1999) both concluded, there was a validity increase when depth of 
information was improved, for participants and researchers alike. In studies that analyze 
the theory and scientific accuracy of the polygraph, comparison groups from alternative 
methods (such as Converus) would be greatly useful. 
Conclusion 
As a modified replication of Myers et al. (2006), their definitions and terms were 
used to create the framework of this study. H1 was found to be statistically supported; 
jurors displayed a moderate level of belief in polygraph accuracy, not unconditional 
acceptance or anything that suggested they allowed the instrument to fulfill their Supreme 
Court-defined role as trier of fact. H2 was not statistically supported. Survey participants 
in criminal justice courses displayed no significant differences in opinion from 
respondents outside such courses. H3 was also not supported by statistical analysis. 
Receiving the extra information on polygraphs did not result in significantly different 
opinions on the polygraph’s use or accuracy. An overarching theme of the analysis was 
the problem of small sample size. Originally, logistic regression analysis was planned, 
but the issue of sample size precluded this from being used. The issue of sample size also 
increased the likelihood of type II error. Because the sample was very small, it is difficult 
to conclude that there was even enough data to make a valid decision on the research 
hypotheses. However, the understudied nature of the topic (polygraph perceptions among 
laypersons) made this study a valuable contribution to this body of research. 
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Statement of Informed Consent 
 
Survey Participants 
Boise State University 
 
 
You are being asked to take part in a survey regarding perceptions of the justice 
system, courts, polygraphs, and their credibility relative to other forms of evidence. The 
information collected from this survey will be used to determine the level of belief in the 
polygraph as well as perceptions on how it should be utilized. Questions will be asked 
about polygraph usage in criminal courts, usage outside criminal courts, allowance of 
examiner testimony, and comparison to other frequent types of evidence. This survey is 
being administered as a component of Mr. Jacob Schiess’ thesis in the Department of 
Criminal Justice. 
 
This survey represents a request for completely voluntary participation on your 
part; and your responses will remain totally confidential—neither your name nor any 
other identifying information will be asked or recorded nor will your identity be linked to 
any responses you provide. In addition, at any time during the survey, you may elect to 
skip any question asked or cease the entire process without penalty. 
 
The Institutional Review Board at Boise State University, which reviews all 
proposed research involving human subjects, has approved this survey as meeting all 
requirements for the protection of the confidentiality of responses of survey participants. 
 
If you have any questions concerning this survey, please feel free to contact us. 
Please write the following numbers down. The principal investigator, Mr. Jacob Schiess 
can be reached at (208) 890-4346. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Office of Research Administration at (208) 426-5401. Dr. Lisa Bostaph, the 
co-investigator, can be reached at (208) 426-3886. If the survey places you under any 
measure of psychological stress for any reason, and you wish to seek counselling or other 
aid, University Health Services can be reached at (208) 426-1459. If you notice signs of 
stress in others, you can submit a report to the university CARE program at (208) 426-
1527, or room 116 of the Norco building. 
 
Before we begin, do you understand that your participation in its entirety or with 
regard to specific questions is completely voluntary, and that your responses will be kept 
confidential by the researchers? 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation. 
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Survey Protocol 
  
The following survey is confidential. Please do not add your student ID, first or 
last name, or any identifying characteristic beyond the demographic question in the 
survey. Please answer all questions truthfully and do not leave any blank. 
  
For your convenience, the following definitions are available for your reference: 
  
Polygraph: an instrument designed to detect and record changes in physiological 
characteristics, such as pulse or breathing rates 
 
Control question test: a form of polygraph exam which compares a test subject’s 
detected responses to relevant questions with their responses to control questions 
 
Relevant question: an exam question which directly relates to the subject of 
investigation (e.g. “Did you rob John Smith?”) 
 
Control question: an exam question which does not relate to the subject of 
investigation, but often asks about generally illegal / undesirable acts (e.g. “Have you 
ever assaulted anyone in your life?”) 
  
Fingerprint evidence: any police-gathered and analyzed materials which require a 
professional fingerprint examiner to interpret 
  
DNA evidence: all forms of blood work and body fluid analysis performed within 
forensic laboratories 
  
Eyewitness evidence: all forms of individual testimony (either the victim or 
bystanders, excluding the distinct concept of expert witnesses) 
  
Handwriting evidence: police investigation and subjective analysis of handwriting 
  
Types of polygraph evidence: 
 positive indications: passed tests (no deception detected) 
 negative indications: failed tests (deception detected) 
 lack of polygraph evidence (no test administered) 
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Survey Questions 
Q1 
Based on the trial vignette provided, my verdict on the accused individual is? 
 Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
 Not guilty 
Q2 
I believe there is a ____% probability (from 0 – 100) that the accused individual 
committed the crime. 
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Q3 
On a range from 0 – 100%, how accurate do you believe the polygraph is? ____% 
(in general, not specific to this case) 
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Q4 
How accurate (from 0 – 100%) do you believe you are at detecting deception 
informally? ____% 
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Q5 
How much did the polygraph evidence in the vignette influence your decision on 
guilt? 
 Not influenced at all 
 Slightly influenced 
 Moderately influenced 
 Greatly influenced 
 Extremely influenced 
Q6 
Should polygraph examiners be allowed in court to testify that the exam did not 
detect deception (i.e. the test subject was not lying)? 
 Yes 
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 No 
Q7 
Should polygraph examiners be allowed in court to testify that the exam did 
detect deception (i.e. the test subject was lying)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
 
Q8 
Which of the following statements best describes your opinion of the polygraph as 
evidence to be used in court? 
 Sufficiently reliable to be the sole determinant (i.e. a polygraph exam result 
should be the only evidence needed to prove a case) 
 Useful diagnostic tool when considered with other available information (i.e. 
an exam result can be helpful when combined with other evidence) 
 Of questionable usefulness, entitled to little weight against other information 
(i.e. when present, an exam result should be viewed as weaker than most other 
evidence) 
 Of no usefulness 
Q9 
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In your opinion, is the polygraph more or less trustworthy than the other evidence 
types listed? Fill in the blanks in each sentence accordingly. 
   Column Options   
   
Polygraph evidence 
is ____ 
 
   
MORE 
trustworthy 
than 
LESS 
trustworthy 
than 
 
Fingerprint 
evidence 
     
DNA 
evidence 
     
Handwriting 
evidence 
     
Eyewitness 
evidence 
     
 
 
Q10 
What is your age? If you would rather not disclose it, do not answer this question. 
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Q11 
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What is your sex? If you would rather not disclose it, do not answer this question. 
 Male 
 Female 
Q12 
What level of course are you taking this survey as part of? 
 100-level 
 200-level 
 300-level 
 400-level 
 
 
 
 
Q13 
Was this survey administered to you in a criminal justice course? If you answer 
no, skip question 14. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not applicable 
Q14 
If this survey was administered to you in a criminal justice course, did it require 
upper-division standing? 
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 Yes 
 No 
 × Not applicable 
Q15 
Do you or a significant other (parent, spouse, immediate relative) work as a 
polygraph examiner or as a member of a criminal justice agency? 
 Yes 
 No 
Unsure / do not know 
 
 
 
 
Q16 
If you received an additional document which gave four examples of supportive / 
critical polygraph literature, how much did it affect your decision on guilt? If you did not 
receive said document, skip this question. 
 Not influenced at all 
 Slightly influenced 
 Moderately influenced 
 Greatly influenced 
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 Extremely influenced 
 I did not receive the additional document 
Q17 
Do you have any additional comments regarding this study? 
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Trial Vignette 
California resident John Doe, a citizen with no prior record, is being charged with 
the crime of first-degree homicide for killing his long-time girlfriend Jane Doe. State law 
allows the introduction of polygraph evidence to the jury and for jurors to draw their own 
conclusions from the results. There were no eyewitnesses to the crime, and the overall 
state of the evidence is relatively even. During the course of the trial, the defense brought 
forward evidence that John had taken and passed a respiration- and heartrate-based 
control question polygraph exam which examined his involvement in and knowledge of 
the crime. The polygraph examiner testified in court that, in their professional opinion, 
the results were inconclusive as to whether or not John had knowledge of the homicide. 
The examiner also testified that, in their professional opinion, John had been truthful 
when he denied having committed the homicide. The defense argued that John cannot be 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of this homicide and is pointing to the 
conclusively negative response from the polygraph (in regards to John’s commission of 
the crime) as an indication of their client’s innocence. 
The prosecution’s primary pieces of evidence were a bloodstained piece of fabric 
and a hair found on John Doe which was identified as belonging to the victim. The 
bloodstained fabric came from the shirt that Jane was wearing at the time of her death, 
and the blood was identified by DNA analysis to belong to her as well. The prosecution 
had also conclusively established that John had recently taken out a large life insurance 
policy on Jane. John was the last person to be seen with Jane prior to her death and was 
apprehended at a friend’s house nearby within 24 hours of the police discovering Jane’s 
body. The prosecution argued that John had the motive (collecting the insurance money), 
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and he killed Jane by strangling her to death with a rope. The police were not able to 
locate the rope in question, but the marks found on Jane’s body make it very clear that 
she was strangled to death in that manner. 
You are the foreman on a 12-person jury hearing this case. You and your fellow 
jurors are determining whether John Doe is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. California 
law requires the verdict to be unanimous. The prosecution, in their closing arguments, 
attacked the defense’s introduction of polygraph evidence as being improperly 
administered. They contend that the results can be ascribed to a ‘friendly polygrapher’, 
who they claim the defense located for the purposes of the trial. The defense argued in 
opposition that there was no such ‘friendly polygrapher’ effect. They point to the severity 
and notoriety of the crime as significant obstacles for any ‘friendly polygrapher’ to 
overcome.  
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Additional Literature Summary For Respondents 
            As with any topic in the justice system, there are critics and proponents to 
polygraphs and their usage in trials and other courtroom processes. When the instrument 
was first introduced to courts in 1923, it was prohibited in courtrooms under the Frye test, 
which required any evidentiary technology to have obtained “general acceptance” within 
the scientific community. Not until the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
(1993) was a new rule put into place which now requires judges to choose whether they 
will allow the polygraph in court, based on their own research and professional judgment. 
Literature exists that might lend credence to certain types of polygraph exams. Honts and 
Raskin (1988) found that 85% of innocent individuals and 92% of guilty individuals (in a 
mock crime scenario) were labelled as such by a control question test (CQT) polygraph. 
Furthermore, countermeasure attempts by test subjects to beat the polygraph were found 
to be ineffective. Myers et al. (2006) found that the concern some judges have regarding 
the polygraph’s supposedly extreme influence on jurors is also not present. 
            Problems exist for supporters of the polygraph. U.S. military courts and 
service branches prohibit the introduction of polygraph evidence as part 707 of their 
Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Scheffer (1998) resulted in a 
ruling that upheld the ban as constitutional. Within the civil / criminal sector, lawyers and 
proponents of the polygraph must demonstrate that evidence does not violate part 403 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). FRE 403 bans the introduction of evidence if its 
value as evidence is outweighed by the danger of introducing prejudice, if it misleads the 
jury, or confuses the issue at hand. Because polygraph examiners occasionally are 
required to testify in court on the exact meaning of test results, it is possible that judges 
could take exception with polygraphs under any of the three restrictions of FRE 403. The 
Supreme Court itself said in U.S. v. Scheffer (1998, pp. 4 - 9) that, “There is no 
consensus in the scientific community that the polygraph is reliable.”
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This research was conducted under approval from the Institutional Review Board at 
Boise State University, protocol #(044‐SB17‐149) 
 
 
